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THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH
SAMUEL W. BUELL*
Overbreadth in criminal liability rules, especially in federal law, is abundant and
much lamented.  Overbreadth is avoidable if it results from normative mistakes
about how much conduct to criminalize or from insufficient care to limit open tex-
ture in statutes.  Social planners cannot so easily avoid overbreadth if they cannot
reach behaviors for which criminalization is well justified without also reaching
behaviors for which it is not.  This mismatch problem is acute if persons engaging
in properly criminalized behaviors deliberately alter their conduct to avoid punish-
ment and have resources to devote to avoidance efforts.  In response to such efforts,
legal actors are apt to expand liability rules further, feeding a cycle of evasion and
overbreadth that characterizes important areas of contemporary criminal law.
Lawmakers cannot purge the resulting overbreadth from liability rules without pro-
ducing underbreadth, at significant cost to regulatory objectives.  I conclude that, in
some areas of expanding substantive criminal law, answers to “overcriminaliza-
tion” therefore lie not in reducing the scope of conduct rules but in greater reliance
on mens rea doctrines, redesign of enforcement institutions, and modification of
sentencing practices.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1492
I. OVERBREADTH IN THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1497
A. Overcriminalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1497
B. Overbreadth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1501
C. Evasion and Overbreadth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1507
D. Institutional Actors and Overbreadth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1512
1. Instrumental Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1513
2. Motivating Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1523
II. OVERBREADTH IN DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1526
A. Racketeering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1527
B. Money Laundering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1536
C. Obstruction of Legal Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1541
D. Loopholing and Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1546
III. OVERBREADTH AND AGENCY COSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1553
A. Adapting Liability Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1555
B. Institutional Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1559
* Copyright © 2008 by Samuel Buell, Associate Professor and Israel Treiman Faculty
Fellow, Washington University School of Law.  Email:  swbuell@wulaw.wustl.edu.  My
gratitude to Dean Kent Syverud for his generous research support.  For valuable com-
ments, criticisms, and discussions, many thanks to Susan Appleton, Samuel Bagenstos,
Mitchell Berman, Kathleen Brickey, Gerrit De Geest, John Drobak, Brandon Garrett,
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Emily Hughes, Peter Joy, Pauline Kim, Neil Richards, Daniel
Richman, Adam Rosenzweig, Margo Schlanger, Ronald Wright, and participants in faculty
workshops at Washington University School of Law and Georgetown University Law
Center.  Colman McCarthy contributed excellent research assistance.
1491
1492 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1491
C. Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1561
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1563
INTRODUCTION
What could possibly be desirable about overbreadth in a liability
rule?  Seemingly nothing, if overbreadth is defined as a region in
which a legal prohibition sanctions behavior outside the class of
wrongdoing or harm-creation that the rule is designed to address.
This point should have particular force in criminal law.  With criminal
prohibitions, not only might an overbroad law create worries about
sunk costs in the form of wasteful overdeterrence, needless enforce-
ment expenses, and the opportunity for discrimination and caprice by
state actors, but it can also produce unjust treatment of individuals
who are not blameworthy or have not had notice that a course of con-
duct might lead to deprivation of liberty.  Constitutional law, through
a cluster of legality-related doctrines, accordingly places special
(though weakly enforced) constraints on the breadth of criminal lia-
bility rules.1
I nonetheless will demonstrate that sometimes overbreadth in the
definition of crimes should be welcomed, or at least seen as a neces-
sary evil.  The case for this assertion has been missed in the busy and
productive discussion about the expansion of substantive criminal law
that has occupied the attention of so many scholars in recent years.
Much has been written about the excessiveness in contemporary
American criminal law.2  Law and society, we have been told count-
less times, are greatly overcriminalized.  A political system that is dys-
functional as measured by overall social welfare has produced
criminal codes that, at least as written, stretch much too far into ordi-
nary life activities that are neither harmful nor genuinely blame-
worthy.  These codes are so deep, redundant, and larded with
excessive penalties that they have effectively delegated to executive
branch actors the power to determine the true content of the criminal
law through enforcement practices, especially through the creation of
a skewed market for plea bargains.3
These critical accounts target both rules that should never have
been enacted and ones that are overbroad.  For example, a rule that
1 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79–81 (1968)
(analyzing legality concept within scope of modern criminal law).
2 See sources cited infra notes 15–16.
3 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
8–15), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114172  (critiquing substantive federal crim-
inal law as producing excessive leverage for prosecutors in plea bargaining).
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punishes possession of a small amount of heroin as a felony might
overcriminalize by sanctioning a self-destructive vice that health and
welfare policies might better address.  A criminal prohibition on all
heroin possession might also be an instance of overcriminalization if a
prudent, more narrow rule would ban only cases of distribution above
a certain weight threshold, leaving mere possession cases for noncrim-
inal approaches.  Both instances produce the same social harm by
extending criminal sanctions beyond culpable actors who pose a gen-
uine risk to others.  And both may lack justifications sufficient to
make these costs worth incurring.
Overbreadth, however, can diverge from the basic case of over-
criminalization.  Sometimes the social welfare inquiry is less straight-
forward than the question of whether a criminal prohibition’s
proponents have a convincing normative case for criminalizing a par-
ticular behavior.  Instead, the inquiry may involve the question of
whether the benefits of extending the sanction to behaviors carrying
good justifications for punishment outweigh the costs of simultane-
ously extending the sanction to different behaviors that lack such jus-
tifications.  For example, a rule prohibiting all heroin possession
above a certain weight threshold might be justified, all things consid-
ered, even if a good argument for criminalization extends only to all
instances of heroin selling—because the law cannot reach all dealing
except by sanctioning possession above the threshold.
When are lawmakers most likely to encounter this form of over-
breadth?  To some extent, the problem arises every time an ex ante
linguistic formulation runs out of precision in describing the cases to
which it will apply in the unseen future.  Ineradicable open texture in
statutes, however, is not very interesting to a discussion of the
problem of criminal law’s expansion.  There is no real controversy that
open texture should be minimized and that some degree of open tex-
ture is necessary and acceptable.  Modern criminal law has reached a
reasonably settled conclusion that, in terms of rule-of-law values, open
texture in statutes formulated ex ante is a preferable evil to a general
license to the judiciary to make criminal law ex post.4
Normatively justified criminalization is more likely to generate
overbreadth in more interesting and less tractable ways when it
targets actors who adapt their behaviors to legal regimes.  The
dilemma of a criminal law being unable to reach its intended targets
4 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.01 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing evolution of criminal law from judge-made common law to statutes); cf. Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, Toward a Just and Rational Body of Substantive Criminal Law, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 367, 367 (2008) (describing necessary conditions for adequate precision,
fairness, effectiveness, and administrability in criminal prohibition).
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without reaching unintended ones is especially acute when the govern-
ment promulgating the rule and the targeted actor are in competition
with each other.  If an actor takes steps to thwart the state from
applying a rule to the actor, the state may face a choice of either aban-
doning pursuit of the actor or expanding the rule to reverse the effects
of the actor’s thwarting behavior, producing overbreadth in the rule.
Or, thinking ahead a move or more, the state may prefer in the first
instance to choose a broad prohibition that is less easily avoided.
For example, suppose heroin distribution networks have organ-
ized themselves to make it unlikely that the state will apprehend any
member of the network actually engaged in dealing, or even pos-
sessing, more than a small amount of heroin.  In its effort to punish
heroin dealing given such conditions, the state might choose a rule
that sanctions even low-quantity possession.  This prevents the dealing
network from avoiding sanction through its enterprise structure, but it
risks criminalizing behavior that is better left to health and welfare
services.5
This dynamic can be stated in terms of a basic economic model of
behavior regulation in which deterrence is a function of expected
sanctions, which are on-the-books sanctions discounted by the
probability of their imposition.6  As actors who desire to engage in
law-violating behaviors invest resources to drive down the probability
of sanctioning, the state naturally seeks means to push that probability
back up in order to maintain expected sanctions at levels believed suf-
ficient to deter.7  When on-the-books sanctions are already extremely
high, as is true for most serious crimes, the state must look beyond
enhancing punishment levels.  Policing to raise probability of sanc-
tioning is expensive—past a point, prohibitively so.  Tailoring of pro-
cedural rules is restricted by society’s commitment to equality of
treatment by the law and the courts.8  Legal actors thus will tend to
expand substantive law in order to facilitate imposition of liability
where actors’ efforts to structure their behavior to evade liability
would otherwise impede sanctioning.
Discussions of overcriminalization have largely omitted this
problem.  With its heavy and often trenchant focus on the political
5 Of course, it will not always be easy in practice to distinguish evasion from deter-
rence.  Those possessing small amounts of heroin will not self-identify as having been
deterred by the dealing prohibition or having organized themselves to circumvent it.  The
overbreadth problem thus arises in both law design and enforcement.
6 See infra note 45 for discussion of the basic deterrence model.
7 The same is true if incapacitation—that is, a hundred-percent probability of sanc-
tion—is the state’s goal.
8 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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process driving criminal law and its enforcement, the literature has
neglected a key dynamic actor in the legal system:  the criminal.9
There is little harm in this neglect if it is roughly accurate to think of
this actor as a static player whose behavior is the product of fixed,
preexisting preferences and who is merely a recipient of expected
legal sanctions determined by the state.  Such a model holds in many
instances and may be especially accurate for the kinds of less dan-
gerous or blameworthy behaviors to which overcriminalized law is
often applied.10  But if the criminal actor is resourceful and strategic—
which often means the actor is particularly threatening and blame-
worthy—the failure to focus on the dynamism of the regulated actor
can be a significant mistake.
The objective of this Article is to call attention to the relationship
between the dynamic violator of the law and the development and
management of overbreadth in criminal prohibitions.  My positive
ambition is to establish that some overbreadth—including in some
criminal prohibitions that are often central to accounts of over-
criminalization—is the product of implementation problems in
behavior regulation, rather than first-order mistakes about whether to
criminalize particular conduct.  My normative ambition is to begin the
quite different assessment that must be performed in such an instance
of overbreadth:  consideration not of whether society should
criminalize a particular behavior but of whether the benefits of main-
taining a legal regime’s effectiveness in controlling a behavior that
should be criminalized are outweighed by the costs of the regime’s
necessary and simultaneous application to behaviors that should not
be.11  Federal criminal law is the best vehicle for conducting such an
inquiry because it is both full of overbreadth and commonly utilized to
sanction sophisticated, resourceful, and harmful actors.12
9 I hasten to add that the literature has not neglected this person when discussing him
or her as a prisoner.  Perhaps the literature’s chief concern has been the production of too
many such persons and the social and individual costs of that process.  But the focus has
principally been on a person who is a product of the legal process, rather than on a person
whose behavior supplies a dynamic input to that process.
10 For examples, see infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
11 I thus mean to exclude from this inquiry situations in which it may be sufficient for
society to rely on civil sanctions to achieve its objectives, or at least to rely first on civil
sanctions to specify prohibited behaviors.  Situations in which the civil sanction approach is
not available include wrongs for which such sanctions do not deliver adequate desert,
offenders whose relative insolvency makes such sanctions ineffective, and behaviors that
adapt so well or so quickly that to specify wrongs “first” with civil liability is to specify
them only with civil liability.
12 Although I do not worry as much as some others that active criminal enforcement in
federal court undesirably tilts the balance of governance from state to federal systems, I do
not mean to enter into that discussion in this Article.  I highlight the federal criminal jus-
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Society has several choices in responding to the type of over-
breadth I have described.  One is to accept that the behavior in ques-
tion cannot be regulated effectively without undue cost—that is, to
choose underbreadth rather than overbreadth.  Underbreadth is not
acceptable if the behavior is particularly harmful, especially if there
might be alternatives to such a trade.  Another option is to hope that
enforcers will not apply an overbroad prohibition to undesired targets
that fall in the statute’s region of overbreadth.  This is essentially the
compromise with overbreadth that the existing criminal justice system
has reached.  There is some appeal in this approach, including that it
has worked better than one might have expected.13  But it would be a
mistake to ignore its substantial costs, most importantly the agency
costs14 that arise when broad prohibitions confer wide authority on
prosecutors to use their charging decisions and plea bargaining prac-
tices to determine the true content of the criminal law.
Social planners should therefore explore ways to control those
agency costs other than by narrowing liability rules at the expense of
being unable to sanction harmful behaviors.  I will argue that there are
a number of alternatives, including alteration of mens rea doctrines in
liability rules, institutional redesign within the executive branch, and
exploitation of the sentencing process.
If I succeed in persuading readers that some instances of over-
breadth in criminal law are unavoidable—even desirable—my case
should lend support to arguments that the problem of expanding
prosecutorial discretion in American criminal law demands greater
attention and creativity as a matter of scholarly inquiry and law
reform.  Greater and wiser controls on prosecutorial decisionmaking
are not simply a second-best alternative to what many have concluded
is a hopeless quest to convince legislatures to narrow criminal codes.
They are a necessary and desirable feature of a criminal justice system
that successfully sanctions behaviors that most demand sanctioning.
The coin of the rule of law has two sides.  The more familiar one is
stamped with the guarantee that the individual will be protected from
subjection to arbitrary and unjust state power—a principle that func-
tions, among other things, as a constraint on the scope of liability
tice system largely for empirical reasons:  Institutionally and legally, it is structured in ways
that make the dynamics that interest me most salient.
13 By this assertion I mean only that political support for the criminal law shows no
signs of collapsing, even though one might have expected the vastly overreaching scope
that its critics have described eventually to destroy such support.
14 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.1 (7th ed. 2007)
(describing agency cost phenomenon in terms of theory of firm, whereby managers to
whom operation of firm is delegated by owners may stray from pursuing interests of firm’s
owners).
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rules.  The other bears the pledge that the individual will not dispro-
portionately shoulder the costs of submission to social constraints
while others are permitted to operate free of those constraints without
consequence—an idea that sometimes demands greater breadth in lia-
bility rules.
In Part I of this Article, I will supply a theoretical account, illus-
trated with examples, of the competitive dynamic between regulator
and regulated actor that can produce the form of overbreadth I have
described.  In Part II, I will show how this dynamic has influenced the
development of federal criminal law in four important bodies of doc-
trine.  In Part III, I will begin to analyze how best to control the costs
of potentially desirable overbreadth.
I
OVERBREADTH IN THEORY
The phenomena of overcriminalization and overbreadth in lia-
bility rules, though they sometimes overlap, are distinct.  I will distin-
guish these two concepts and explain the particular form of
overbreadth that follows from efforts to sanction behaviors that
society cannot reach except with liability rules that overreach their
targets.  I will further explain how efforts by regulated actors to avoid
liability rules aggravate this form of overbreadth.
A. Overcriminalization
One might charge a lawmaker with producing an overbroad crim-
inal prohibition by saying the law was designed to cover conduct for
which there is not a good case for sanction.  The lawmaker achieved
what she set out to accomplish in enacting the law, but she acted on
the basis of a judgment with which the critic disagrees about the desir-
ability or defensibility of deterring or punishing a particular
behavior.15
Criminal law, especially federal criminal law, has been under
siege for more than a decade (and under fire for longer) by claims in
this vein.16  The academic consensus is that federal criminal law—by
15 For an effort to develop a general rather than offense-specific theory of how contem-
porary law is overcriminalized, see generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION:
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008).
16 The voluminous literature concerning the overcriminalization and federalization of
criminal law includes, among many sources: JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998); John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the
Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 (1999); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing
Crime:  Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 39 (1996); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few:  New Principles To Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Sara Sun
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virtue of the huge array of its statutes and the highly open-textured
nature of many of its prohibitions—includes too many offenses, espe-
cially too many trivial ones, and covers too many people within the
scope of its sanctions.  The criminal law of the states has also been
charged with being bloated and rapacious,17 although there the con-
sensus may be weaker.18
The explanation for the prevalence of such errors, at the federal
level at least, tends to take the following form:19  Federal law criminal-
izes people and conduct that good social policy would not criminalize
because such law is the product of a poorly functioning political
system.  America’s punitive culture expects criminal law to remedy
each new social problem.  The public rewards legislators when they
vote for, and punishes legislators when they vote against, virtually
anything that is perceived or marketed as tough on crime.20  The
recipients of the government’s punitive measures, having been
branded criminal by definition, lack political influence and so cannot
resist this pressure.
Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It?  The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-
Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 23 (1997) [hereinafter Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It?]; Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135
(1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:  The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 643 (1997); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991);
Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2003); Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); Julie R.
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace:  Obstruction Statutes as Case Study,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2006); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005); Ste-
phen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879 (2005); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); Franklin
E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legisla-
tion, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (1996). A precursor to much of this
literature is Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).
17 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 16, at 635–44 (demonstrating “degradation” of
state criminal codes by highlighting experience of Illinois).
18 As Darryl Brown shows in a study of criminal lawmaking at the state level, the over-
criminalization story is more accurate about the federal system than state systems. See
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 234–49 (2007)
(providing examples of state decriminalization and state legislative refusals to enact new
criminal statutes and arguing that breadth of state criminal codes was greater in early twen-
tieth century).
19 This is a simplification of claims made in works such as Beale, What’s Law Got To
Do with It?, supra note 16, at 40–44, and Stuntz, supra note 16, at 529–68.
20 For studies of the sources and structure of this complex punitive culture, see gener-
ally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001), and JONATHAN SIMON, GOV-
ERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007).
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Nobody with power has an incentive to counter these pressures.
Executive branch actors continually press legislators to expand
enforcement powers to increase their ability to process cases easily
and at low cost (primarily through plea bargaining), and perhaps to
bring and win splashy cases that help actors secure lucrative private-
sector employment.21  Legislators oblige because they fear being seen
as impeding executive branch enforcement efforts, and they face little
or no cost in acquiescing to executive branch demands.  To boot, gov-
ernments save money by broadening liability rules because such rules
increase defendants’ incentives to accept plea bargains that save pros-
ecutors from expensive litigation of procedural rights, especially those
that inhere at trial.22
Congress is plainly subject to this criticism when, for example, it
responds to a national panic over carjackings by creating a new fed-
eral crime that mostly duplicates state-law crimes;23 or when, in an
effort to be seen as addressing the epidemic of domestic violence, it
makes it a serious federal felony for a person subject to a restraining
order to possess a gun;24 or when it attempts to put sharper teeth in
the efforts of the administrative state by making it a federal felony to
utter a false statement in any of dozens of regulatory contexts, some
quite trivial.25  I need not display the rogues’ gallery of inadvisable
and sometimes silly federal crimes that the overcriminalization litera-
ture has documented.26
21 See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 533–39, 542–46 (describing incentives for prosecutors to
lobby legislators and highlighting special case of federal prosecutors who desire broad lia-
bility rules that enable them to target high-profile cases).
22 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 56 (1997) (describing incentives of legislatures to
broaden criminal prohibitions in order to reduce litigation costs).  Stuntz also notes that
broad liability rules are often found in areas like white-collar crime and public corruption
that involve offenders who tend to be well-off and thus expensive to prosecute. Id. at
56–58, 66.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000).
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).
25 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6519(b) (2000) (establishing as felony making of false statement
to certain government officials in sale or labeling of organic foods).
26 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 16, at 531–33 (describing actual and proposed federal
prohibitions on carjacking, “white slave” trafficking, domestic violence, and hate crimes,
all of which seek to regulate behavior already subject to state criminal law).  Many of these
forms of excess in criminal codes have a negligible impact on caseloads in the courts.  See
HUSAK, supra note 15, at 35 (“[M]ost of these laws, however amusing, are rarely enforced
and certainly cannot be blamed for causing the massive increase in punishment throughout
the United States today.”); Brown, supra note 18, at 272–73 (observing in overview of state
criminal systems that “most prosecutions occur under a fairly small set of statutes”).   In
2000, approximately 25,000 persons were prosecuted in federal court for drug offenses,
approximately 6000 for firearms offenses, approximately 4500 for fraud crimes, and
approximately 2000 for offenses involving extortion, robbery, money laundering, and rack-
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The costs of such ill-advised lawmaking exceed the waste of
public resources.  Since at least the 1950s, scholars have worried that
expanding the universe of behaviors covered by the criminal law could
render impotent the very social mechanism that distinguishes criminal
sanctioning from civil penalties, and that some argue defines it:  its
condemnatory function.27  Whether these warnings have proved pre-
scient, and if not, why not, is an interesting and underexplored empir-
ical issue.  The concern continues to be taken seriously, however, and
rightly so.28
Overextension of criminal sanctions can have more easily
observed effects that are plenty worrisome.  Valuable social activities
may be wastefully deterred, either because the law clearly prohibits an
activity that is perfectly welcome—or that should be allowed if the
actor is willing to pay some cost—or because the law is so broad that it
makes actors overly risk-averse in their behavioral decisions.29  Broad
criminal prohibitions may also produce cases of injustice, especially
eteering; only about 150 were prosecuted for carjacking, about 500 for uttering false state-
ments in federal matters, and about 20 for interstate domestic violence—to take just three
offenses often described as needlessly criminalized or inappropriately made subject to fed-
eral jurisdiction.  These rough data were obtained using the search function available on
the website of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center,
http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 6, 2008) (click on “U.S. Criminal Code”
link on toolbar and input section numbers for those statutes most commonly used to prose-
cute various categories of offenses:  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (fraud); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (fire-
arms); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028–1031, 1341–1348 (fraud); 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (robbery, extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957 (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1963 (racke-
teering); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2262 (domestic violence); 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 848, 960, 963 (drug offenses); and 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871 (firearms)).
27 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
404 (1958); Kadish, supra note 16, at 437.
28 See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Miscon-
duct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 44–52 (discussing moral function of
criminal punishment and applying stigma theory of criminal law to corporate misconduct).
29 Of course, it is not self-evident that a prohibition criminalizes “blameless” behavior
in areas such as fraud or firearms offenses that shift along fluid boundaries of social con-
demnation and evolving norms.  Even seemingly trivial regulatory offenses can turn out to
have normative underpinnings. See generally Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the
Tag Off a Mattress:  Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997) (developing normative defense of criminalizing some regulatory
violations).  If one were to assert that the correct baseline for appropriate criminal sanction
is the “traditional” criminal law, one would have to confront the possibility that “tradi-
tional” substantive criminal law might never have existed in the narrower form imagined.
See Brown, supra note 18, at 233–49 (analyzing evolution of early-twentieth-century and
modern substantive criminal law and suggesting overall trend has been toward contraction
of criminal law’s scope); cf. Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and
the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 21–91 (1996) (mounting his-
torical argument that Framers’ conception of proper scope of federal criminal law was
much broader than many modern accounts of original intent have contended).
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when they lead to deprivation of liberty and not just assets.  People
may find themselves punished even though they could not have rea-
sonably expected their behavior to implicate the criminal law, and
they may become victims of enforcers using the space within expan-
sive liability rules to select persons for punishment on discriminatory
or capricious grounds.
B. Overbreadth
Beyond the basic problem of overcriminalization due to norma-
tive error and political pressure, there are several other ways in which
a lawmaker might produce an overbroad criminal prohibition.  For
example, announcing that sanctions may apply not only to undesirable
behaviors but also to behaviors akin or proximate to undesirable ones
pushes actors back from the boundaries of the law, along the knife-
edge of which policing is difficult, and many cases of undesirable con-
duct are likely to go unsanctioned.  Sometimes lawmakers mean to
overdeter.  An example might be a strict-liability prohibition against
all possession of a dangerous item.30
Alternatively, the limits of a lawmaker’s foresight and linguistic
tools might prevent her from stating in an ex ante formulation exactly
all of the undesirable conduct she wishes to sanction.31  To meet
future unseen cases and to speak in general terms, she cannot avoid
building vagueness and open texture into her liability rule.32  This
practice inevitably results in overbroad sanctioning when the pliable
liability rule is applied to behaviors that meet its terms but do not
have those undesirable features that motivated the lawmaker to create
the prohibition in the first place.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607–10 (1971) (holding that statute
imposed strict liability for all possession of hand grenades without regard to scienter).  Dan
Kahan argues that broad criminal liability rules can be characterized by a “prudence of
obfuscation” that is designed to induce uncertainty and restraint among persons who seek
to pursue undesirable behaviors within the literal terms of legal rules.  Dan M. Kahan,
Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 129
(1997).
31 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
32 See Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117,
120–24 (Antony Flew ed., 1951) (explaining distinction between open texture due to limits
of knowledge and vagueness due to limited precision of language); see also FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 31 (1991) (“The limits of time and understanding make
it impossible to restrict our assessments of cause and effect, or our reports of empirical
truth, to universally correct statements, and so we frequently employ generalizations that
are only probabilistic.”); Stuntz, supra note 16, at 547–48 (discussing example of fraud
statute designed to be broad enough to capture subtle frauds but resulting in overbreadth
because it also covers “only marginally bad actors”).
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Open texture is, to varying degrees, an unavoidable aspect of
nearly all law.  For example, a ban on possession of all firearms by
convicted felons might be overbroad if the word “firearm” could be
interpreted as including toy guns.  But that is not an interesting form
of overbreadth, at least not in terms of the contemporary social
problem of criminal law’s expansion.  Because of the importance of
liberty interests at stake with criminal law, there is less tolerance at
the margin for open texture than with rules of, for example, private
law.  But one could not seriously argue that open texture in criminal
law is prohibited.  Only with a highly abstract rendering of the legality
principle that does not fit existing jurisprudence33 could one support
the claim that criminal statutes must not fail to answer questions
about their application to future cases.
A more trenchant criticism of the firearm ban as overbroad
would be that while many convicted felons are sufficiently dangerous
people to be prevented from possessing guns, many others are not.
But it might be the case that it is too difficult to specify ex ante which
kinds of felons are the sufficiently dangerous ones.  The most we
might be able to say is that we want to convey ex post authority on a
legal actor to apply the ban only to the felons that the actor deter-
mines, all things considered, to be dangerous.
To the extent that this problem exists, it is made much worse if
the regulated actor has the ability and inclination to modify her
behavior in the shadow of the legal rule.34  Under what conditions
does the regulated actor tend to increase pressure on a liability rule to
expand to a state of overbreadth?  A hypothetical may illustrate.  Sup-
pose that at time t1, society determines that it cannot tolerate infre-
quent but horrific maulings and killings of passersby and children by
enraged pit bulls.  It chooses to ban something like “knowing posses-
sion of a pit bull prone to attack humans” by sanctioning such posses-
sion with fines and, given the meager assets of many pit bull hobbyists,
imprisonment.  The ban does not work.  Deadly pit bull attacks
33 See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 195–201 (1985) (describing limited enforcement of legality-
related doctrines); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 345, 345–46 (stating that rule of lenity is enforced much less strongly than many
might believe given principle’s supposedly foundational quality).
34 For this purpose, the felon gun ban no longer seems like a useful example.  If we
narrowed the ban to certain kinds of felonies, would we need to worry that a dangerous
person inclined to commit felonies would shift the form of her prior violations to avoid the
reach of the ban?  Not unless we were genuinely hard-core believers in the logic of deter-
rence. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 181, 197–204 (2004)
(presenting theory and evidence critiquing claim that shape of substantive criminal liability
rules affects individuals’ decisions whether to violate law).
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1503
continue.  Some of these attacks are a dog’s first attack on a human,
allowing even the hobbyists who can be shown to have trained their
pit bulls to attack to claim that the training was aimed at other dogs
and was not expected to cause human injury.  Other hobbyists learn to
train pit bulls in secret, leaving no evidence to prove these owners’
knowledge of their dogs’ violent tendencies, and they anonymously
share training tips on the Internet.
At time t2, society concludes that the value of pit bull ownership
under any circumstance is outweighed by the harm from pit bulls that
attack.  Seeing no alternative but to regulate more broadly than the ill
at issue, lawmakers amend the ban to cover “knowing possession of a
pit bull,” defined as any animal with at least fifty percent pit bull
lineage.  With a few generations of breeding, or perhaps some genetic
engineering, the hobbyists, and the breeders who profit from the hob-
byists’ avidness, develop a new dog that has less than fifty percent pit
bull blood but is equally amenable to aggressiveness training.  The
attacks on humans continue.
At time t3, society faces a choice.  It could try to update the legal
regime to define the prohibited animal to meet the innovations of the
hobbyists and breeders.  Having seen what has occurred and having
considered emerging breeding technologies, lawmakers might be pes-
simistic about this approach.  Each update to the legal scheme may
only lead to new innovations in breeding and training designed to pro-
duce equally harmful dogs that do not fit the law’s definitions.  The
frequency of injurious and deadly attacks is not likely to fall.  Society
therefore chooses another course.  It enacts a ban on “knowing pos-
session of a dog of any breed or from any lineage, which breed or
lineage has a history of attacking humans.”35
Now the law may have the attack-dog enthusiasts where it wants
them:  They must choose between abandoning their pursuit and pro-
ceeding at risk of heavy sanction.  Yet the law is now overbroad.  A
few days after the new ban is enacted, a police officer whose super-
visor chided her that morning for her low productivity arrests a visu-
ally impaired person walking along with a seeing-eye dog of a breed
that prison officials use as an aggressive guard dog.
The law can be changed to include a safe harbor for service dogs,
but doing so would not eliminate or even significantly reduce the
problem of police and prosecutorial discretion.  Thousands, perhaps
millions, of innocuous pet owners are “technically”—that is, actu-
ally—in violation of the ban.  The legislature passed the statute to
35 See Kahan, supra note 30, at 137–40 (describing similar scenario involving efforts to
alter chemical composition of illegal substances in order to avoid drug regulations).
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allay enforcers’ frustration at dealing with the elusive, violence-loving
pit bull trainer.  But the statute also covers the actor who gave no
thought to—indeed had no interest in—structuring her activities or
otherwise investing resources to avoid sanctioning.  Only enforcement
discretion remains to confine the ban to its intended target of owners
of dogs likely to wound or kill humans.36
This same dynamic can cause a criminal liability rule meant for
“serious” cases to end up covering both serious cases and not-so-
serious ones.  Modifying the pit bull case, suppose that at time t1 it is a
felony punishable by fine to “knowingly keep a vicious dog.”  Social
consensus holds that there is no value in the freedom to possess
vicious animals and that anyone who continues to do so in spite of the
ban is a scofflaw.  At time t2, in light of the fact that the law does not
seem to be preventing attacks, lawmakers decide to punish more
severely the keeping of a dog that is vicious toward humans.  Again,
lawmakers conclude that any ban that attempts to define this animal
will be too vulnerable to evasion by the pit bull enthusiasts.  So the
legislature simply raises the penalty for “knowingly keeping a vicious
dog” to up to ten years’ imprisonment.  Persons who keep dogs that
are somewhat vicious but not interested in attacking humans are now
eligible for hard time, whereas before they faced only a fine.  Only
enforcement discretion will determine whether the incarcerated popu-
lation will include such persons or just the truly bloodthirsty pit bull
experts.37
36 In his essential work on what he calls the “pathological politics” of overcriminaliza-
tion, William Stuntz explains that if “a given crime is defined by elements ABC” and “A
and B are easy to prove, but C is much harder,” then for a legislature, “[c]riminalizing AB,
with the understanding that prosecutors will determine for themselves whether C is satis-
fied, raises the odds of conviction and reduces enforcement costs.”  Stuntz, supra note 16,
at 531.  A lawmaker might have the motivation for omitting element C that Stuntz blames
for pathology in criminal law:  acceding to efforts of executive branch actors to hoard
power and to make those actors’ jobs easier, for fear of otherwise appearing soft on crime.
See id. at 548–49 (describing risk legislators face of being blamed for failing to provide
prosecutors with adequate legal tools to pursue culpable actors).  But sometimes element
C might be dropped because C appears very hard or even impossible to prove when the
legislator, a court interpreting the statute, or a prosecutor enforcing the statute considers
how offenders could change their behavior to escape sanction if proof of C were required.
The same effects on trial rates, plea bargaining, and expanding enforcement discretion
follow, but for different reasons and with different implications.
37 This overbreadth in sanctioning—contrasted with overbreadth in criminalization—is
at the root of arguments that the federalization of contemporary criminal law is a social ill.
Leaving aside the abstract (and as yet unproven) claims that the federalization of criminal
law endangers “our federalism,” the gist of these claims has been that current federal crim-
inal law makes a “federal case”—that is, an especially serious one—out of too many cases
that are not at all serious.  Generally speaking, it is much easier for the prosecutor to
obtain a longer sentence in federal than in state court.  Clymer, supra note 16, at 674–75;
Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME &
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Because liability rules are not trans-substantive, legal systems are
likely to resort to them first to deal with a particular class of regulated
actors that proves difficult to sanction.38  A fraud rule applies to all
persons engaged in economic activity that falls within its definition but
not to people engaged in narcotics distribution or bank robberies.  A
procedural or evidentiary rule applies to all persons investigated and
prosecuted, whether engaged in fraud, narcotics distribution, bank
robberies, or any other activity that violates any criminal liability
rule.39
For example, suppose that society perceived public corruption as
inadequately punished and deterred, in part because many persons
charged with corruption crimes were not convicted or, more plausibly,
because prosecutors charged few such cases, believing convictions to
be too difficult to secure.  Suppose further that convictions were diffi-
cult to obtain in these cases, among other reasons, because criminal
defendants were entitled to an instruction that proof beyond a reason-
able doubt means “proof to a certainty”40 and because the
Constitution prevented placing limits on the amount of funds a
wealthy defendant could expend on the assistance of counsel.41
Lawmakers could counteract at least some of this difficulty by broadly
defining the offense as an act by any public official “injurious to the
JUST.:  REV. RES. 377, 404–05 (Michael Tonry ed., 2006).  But, as my doctrinal examples in
Part II will show, some portion of what is called “overfederalization” is a byproduct of the
state’s competition with resourceful actors rather than the fruit of misguided judgments
about which behaviors to subject to the most serious forms of criminal process.
38 Cf. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 801 (1999) (“While the political costs of
narrowing the scope of substantive law appear to be prohibitive, the costs of proposals to
restrict enforcer activities are not . . . .”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 796 (2006) (suggesting that legislators have been
more apt to expand procedural protections than to limit substantive law because proce-
dural protections benefit innocent persons as well as those whose conduct is close to bor-
derline of liability).
39 Cf. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1197, 1217–52 (2007) (examining interplay between evidentiary rules and substan-
tive liability rules in criminal law in terms of net effects on deterrent and retributive objec-
tives for punishment).  Another reason the state might resort to altering liability rules
would be limitations on its ability to regulate directly particular forms of sanction avoid-
ance, such as noncreation of evidence or investment in litigation. See Jacob Nussim &
Avraham Tabbach, (Non)Regulable Avoidance and the Perils of Punishment 8–9 (Bar-Ilan
Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=979363 (describing these limits).
40 This is not the actual law. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 129 & n.2
(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting and discussing recommended reasonable doubt instruction pub-
lished by Federal Judicial Center).
41 This is more or less the actual law. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (describing contours of Sixth Amendment right to spend
money on one’s counsel of choice).
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public interest.”42  It would be far easier to persuade the public and
the courts to support and uphold a broadly defined ban on public cor-
ruption than, for example, to support and uphold a lowering of the
prosecutor’s burden of proof in all criminal cases or a cap on the fees
that could be paid to a criminal defense attorney.43
Of course, when lawmakers expand the substantive criminal law,
the distinction between overcriminalization and overbreadth is not
always crisp and self-evident.  This only aggravates the difficulty of
overbreadth.  The pit bull example is designed as a case in which over-
breadth results even with clear social consensus about the need to
punish the targeted behavior.  If this aspect of the model is relaxed,
cases arise that are not so easily sorted into the categories of over-
criminalization and overbreadth.
Suppose there is clear social consensus that selling heroin should
be a crime but no such consensus that using heroin should be criminal-
ized.  A statute prohibiting only distribution proves ineffective
because dealers can manage not to be caught in the act of transferring
the drugs.  Legislators then broaden the law to criminalize all heroin
possession.  Is this a case of overbreadth because lawmakers con-
cluded that they had to cover the users in order to get at the dealers?
Or is it a case of overcriminalization, because lawmakers wanted to
criminalize the users too, even though social consensus for doing so
was lacking, and they saw the opportunity to smuggle in overcriminal-
ization by calling it unavoidable overbreadth?  Assuming there is
some truth to both descriptions, the question is whether the genuine
social benefits of the broader rule outweigh its residual downside costs
that cannot be controlled except by narrowing the rule.  As I will
explain in Part III, this is the same normative evaluation that should
be conducted in any case of overbreadth.  This balance may come out
differently than it would in a case of “pure” overbreadth like the pit
bull example, but the form of inquiry should be the same.44
42 William Stuntz similarly examines the interplay between law and exogenous forces
by arguing that more robust doctrines of modern criminal procedure give defendants with
resources tools to threaten costly litigation but do not afford equivalent leverage to poor
defendants with resource constraints.  Stuntz, supra note 22, at 56.
43 In his provocative work attacking the rationality of our current system of proof and
procedure for criminal cases, Larry Laudan has suggested, among other things, that it
might make sense to vary rules of proof and procedure according to the type of crime
being prosecuted, specifically depending on the difficulty of securing convictions.  Larry
Laudan, The Social Contract and the Rules of Trial:  Re-thinking Procedural Rules 42
(Feb. 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075403.
Regardless of whether Laudan is persuasive, my point is that politics favors customizing
liability rules.
44 One might further argue that, at least when it comes to evaluating state action, we
should care about effects, and not purposes.  In other words, if social policy favors a
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C. Evasion and Overbreadth
Existing accounts of substantive criminal law’s expansion have
largely missed the regulated actor’s important role in the development
of liability rules.  An actor who wishes to engage in a prohibited
activity will not conclude her efforts with a simple calculation of the
expected sanction for that activity.45  If she does not like the result of
that calculation because it suggests that the activity is too costly, she
may see whether she can reduce the expected sanction.  Unless she
has power in the political economy, she cannot change the sanction on
the books.  She must instead focus her efforts on reducing the
probability of sanction.  Here, she does have some control because it
is she who designs and initiates the behaviors to which the state may
later apply enforcement efforts.  A rational lawmaker, faced with
actors who engage in such efforts, will seek means to drive the
probability of sanctioning back up by attempting to directly
counteract actors’ evasion efforts.  One such means is to broaden lia-
bility rules.
In a utilitarian project of crime control, the probability of sanc-
tioning looms very large for both regulators and regulated actors.
Criminal violators are not risk-neutral.  The consensus of criminolo-
broader prohibition, it is of no matter that a policymaker might have favored the broader
prohibition for selfish or socially unwelcome reasons. See David Enoch, Intending, Fore-
seeing, and the State, 14 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 23–34), avail-
able at  http://www.law.columbia.edu/null?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=13720
(raising doubts about viability of alleged moral distinction between intending and fore-
seeing result of one’s actions, focusing on its viability as measure of state action).
45 In the basic economic model of behavior regulation, deterrence fails when b > p*s:
An individual will choose to violate the law when her expected benefit from the violation
(b) exceeds her expected sanction, defined as the legal sanction (s) discounted by the
probability of its imposition (p). See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
46 (David Young ed., 1986) (“In order for a penalty to achieve its objective, all that is
required is that the harm of the punishment should exceed the benefit resulting from the
crime.”); Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 365, 396 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value
of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he
expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing
it.”); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176–77 (1968) (claiming person will commit crime if its expected utility, including
probability of punishment, exceeds utility of alternative activities).  I omit a component
that neoclassical modeling usually includes:  the social cost of an offense as its net cost,
accounting for both the offender’s gain and society’s loss. See, e.g., id. at 197 (“[T]he rich
man’s purchase [of a car] is equivalent to a ‘theft’ subsequently compensated by a ‘fine’
equal to the price of the car, while the poor man [who steals a car], in effect, goes to prison
because he cannot pay this ‘fine.’”).  I am not persuaded as a normative matter that this
kind of calculation is justified. See Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88
CAL. L. REV. 895, 904 (2000) (arguing that deterrence of crime cannot be analyzed in
purely economic terms without normative theory of which gains to offenders are legitimate
versus illegitimate).
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gists is that the probability of capture overshadows the possible extent
of penalty in the mind of the violator.46  And the crucial variable is
offender perception, not actual probability of capture.47  The rational
offender will choose not to violate the law if what she expects to gain
from the violation is outweighed by her ex ante prediction of an ex
post penalty and the chance it will be imposed, in addition to the
amount of delay she expects to enjoy before its imposition.48  The
probability of apprehension is a function of the offender’s perception
of the relationship between the total number of violations and the
total number of cases of sanctioning in society at large.49
If criminal violations are widespread, if most violators lack signif-
icant wealth, and if the state pursues policy objectives from an already
highly punitive baseline, then the state is constrained in exploiting on-
46 See, e.g., PANEL ON THE UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROL OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 6 (Albert J.
Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).  Writing in 1968, Becker acknowledged this point
but questioned whether the relation between the probability of sanction and the number of
offenses had been adequately explained. See Becker, supra note 45, at 176.
47 See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 276–77 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon
L. Smith eds., 2005) (explaining that availability bias suggests offenders will weigh salient
cases of enforcement heavily in calculating probability of sanction); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 403, 439 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2006) (noting that indi-
viduals’ knowledge about probability of sanctions may be incomplete or erroneous for
variety of reasons); see also Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789,
793–96 (2007) (exploring how lawmakers can exploit gaps between public perceptions of
risk levels and true risk levels); Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 185 (noting problem
for deterrence theory that offenders tend to underestimate probability that they, rather
than others, will be caught).
48 See BECCARIA, supra note 45, at 36–37 (arguing that closeness in time between pun-
ishment and crime will strengthen deterrent message of punishment); Robinson & Darley,
supra note 34, at 193–95 (arguing that psychological studies involving dogs demonstrate
that rapidity of drop-off in effects of punishment due to passage of time between transgres-
sion and punishment is dramatic and that studies involving humans demonstrate that
future events are heavily discounted).
49 See Rosa Ferrer, Breaking the Law When Others Do:  A Model of Law Enforcement
with Neighborhood Externalities 2 (Mar. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=958630 (discussing externality of congestion in enforcement and
its effect on optimal enforcement policy); see also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig,
Broken Windows:  New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006) (explaining and critiquing hypothesis that punishing low-
level disorder offenses reduces crime overall by counteracting perception that police are
absent and probability of sanctioning is low).  For an attempt to develop a formal model of
how individuals acquire perceptions of the probability of sanction from their environments,
see Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272 (1991).  For
a critique of Becker and others for failing to account for how crime rates (denominators)
affect probability of sanctioning, see Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and
Expected Sanctions:  The Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485
(2001).
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the-books sanctions and must use probability of sanctioning to
enhance deterrence.50  Continuing to increase legal sanctions in such
conditions would lead to a system that is both Singaporean (where
minor violations are punished with severe imprisonment terms,
offending normative commitments) and ineffective (as the law sup-
plies no incentive for violators, once violating, not to commit addi-
tional and more serious offenses).51  Norms and marginal deterrence
demand proportionality in punishment.52
Whether its objective is deterrence or incapacitation, then, the
state faces pressure to concentrate its efforts on the probability of
sanctioning.  The more committed the offender—meaning the more a
person’s criminal violations represent a profession rather than an
impulsive diversion—the more valuable will be the offender’s invest-
ments in evading sanction.  A continuous or repeat offender can be
expected to calculate her probability of apprehension not as offense
specific but in sum across all of her offenses and to predict that a
single instance of apprehension may lead to lengthy or permanent
incapacitation.53  The hardest regulatory problems for the state come
not from actors who invest in efforts to reduce the probability of sanc-
tioning but from actors who both invest in such efforts and are deter-
mined to accomplish undesirable behaviors unless they are halted by
50 Becker famously argued that the most efficient means for enhancing deterrence is to
increase the on-the-books sanction for an offense and to do so in the form of a fine rather
than imprisonment.  Becker, supra note 45, at 193–98; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 96–98
(1984) (explaining how offender wealth constrains maximal fine and how disutility
imposed by imprisonment rises with wealth).  As Steven Shavell has explained, enforce-
ment efforts such as policing can be general rather than specific, meaning that the state
decides how much enforcement to pursue not according to the specific activity sanctioned,
but rather according to all crimes or a class of crimes such as “street crime.” See generally
Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991).
51 Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pt. 2), 37
COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1265–66 (1937).
52 BECCARIA, supra note 45, at 14–16.
53 See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 530
(1970) (“If the probability of detection is p for one offense, it is 1 – (1 – p)n for at least one
conviction in n offenses, and this expression approaches unity as n becomes large.”); cf.
Jolls, supra note 47, at 279 (noting that prospect theory suggests that, in decision whether
to violate law, offenders weigh first increment of penalty more heavily than equal, addi-
tional increments of penalty).  The relevance of sanction probability is not its effect on this
actor’s calculation whether to violate (the actor is assumed to be nondeterrable) but its
contribution to the social cost of imprisoning the actor:  Incapacitation will be justified
when the cost of imposing sanctions plus the cost of carrying them out are less than the
social cost of the actor’s future offenses across the period of incapacitation. Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 47, at 443; Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, AM.
ECON. REV., May 1987, at 107, 107–08 (Papers and Proceedings).
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the state, as they are the actors who will invest most heavily and most
continuously in such efforts.
Of course, the state may also benefit when actors face the neces-
sity of investing in liability avoidance.  If the costs of avoiding a lia-
bility rule are sufficiently great to cause an actor to refrain from a
harmful activity, deterrence has succeeded.  If some remaining actors
nonetheless press forward with harmful activities in the face of such
costs, it may not be worth deterring them if the marginal cost of com-
peting with such actors (including costs associated with an overbroad
liability rule) exceed the marginal costs of those actors’ harmful activi-
ties.  With any given criminal activity, it will be an empirical question
whether the chase of the evasive actor continues, all things consid-
ered, to be worthwhile for the state.  Social planners would need to
know, among other things, the number of persons who continue to
violate the law, the total costs of the harms that violators produce, and
the costs associated with the number of persons who do not produce
such harms but are nonetheless punished under the applicable over-
broad prohibition.  I will return to questions of net social costs in Part
III.  For the purposes of establishing a theoretical framework for the
problem of overbreadth, one need only agree that there will be some
circumstances in which the balance of costs favors determined pursuit
of the determined violator.
Analysis of law enforcement following Bentham and Becker
often proceeds as if the probability of sanctioning were a function of
how much society chooses to expend on policing.54  The matter is not
so simple.  Resources devoted to policing matter a lot, but so do many
other things, including evidentiary and procedural rules and, central to
my endeavor, both the contours of substantive liability rules and the
resources (intellectual, financial, organizational, and so on) that
offenders devote to preventing the imposition of sanctions.55
The evasion problem, and its relationship to the development of
liability rules, extends beyond efforts to avoid detection of criminal
acts.56  The phenomenon that, as Chris Sanchirico says, “violators
54 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Harel, supra note 49, at 495 (“The policy maker has two policy
variables at her disposal:  the level of investment in law enforcement, x, and the legal sanc-
tion, l.”).
55 Becker acknowledged this avenue of inquiry but did not pursue it. See Becker, supra
note 45, at 195–96 (noting that offenders with higher income have incentive to spend
resources on offense planning, legal counsel, litigation, bribery, and other efforts to reduce
probability of imprisonment).
56 Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006).
Examining how sanctioning regimes generate incentives for violators to commit second-
order, obstructive violations leads Sanchirico to conclude that the state could become
caught in a recursive spiral with violators:  The state must increase sanctions at ever-higher
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themselves can affect the probability of detection,”57 is more general
than cover-ups and obstruction-of-justice offenses.  On the offender’s
side, the means available to evade sanctioning encompass the entire
manner in which forward-thinking violators structure their conduct in
the shadow of regulatory regimes.  On the state’s side, the tools avail-
able to counteract such measures go beyond enhancement of penalties
in cases involving additional obstructive violations to encompass the
full regime of substantive and procedural law that controls the sanc-
tioning process.58
The actor seeks to accomplish a given objective in the manner
that carries the lowest expected probability of sanction and thus the
lowest expected sanction.  The state tries to prevent the actor from
accomplishing a socially undesirable objective by raising the
probability of sanction to achieve deterrence or incapacitation.  For
both players, any available tool will do.59  If the regulated actor seeks
to avoid sanction by, for example, delegating to underlings conduct
that comprises the actus reus of a particular offense, the state may
respond by redefining the offense or by defining a new offense so that
the targeted actor’s personal commission of the actus reus is no longer
a requirement for imposition of liability.60
orders to offset the manner in which sanctions at lower orders encourage offenders to
engage in additional offenses, such as evidence destruction, designed to evade the imposi-
tion of sanctions.  Id. at 1367–69; see also Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and
Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON. 341, 343–44, 350–52 (1990) (treating indi-
vidual’s expenditures on avoiding detection as negative input to individual’s expected
utility from committing violation); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:
Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 599–605
(2006) (arguing for offsetting evaders’ efforts to reduce probability of sanctioning with
device that would increase sanctions for evasive methods that are more difficult for tax
auditors to detect); Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance 3, 25
(2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=844828 (noting that
higher sanctions both increase marginal benefit of avoidance efforts and increase marginal
cost of such efforts by increasing expected sanctions for avoidance).
57 Sanchirico, supra note 56, at 1363.
58 Indeed, enhancing sanctions for a particular offense based on obstructive conduct is
not an available response if the offender’s evasion move is to change her behavior to avoid
liability in the first place.
59 Of course, one tool may be selected over another due to marginal costs.  An ounce of
wider liability rule may be chosen over an ounce of more policing because liability rules
are cheaper by the ounce, even if policing yields more deterrence per ounce. See William
J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2025, 2029–34 (2008) (arguing that, as
evaluated by criterion of racially neutral impact, federal government should address
modern urban violence by devoting greater resources to state and local policing, rather
than by enhancing scope and punitiveness of prohibitions, and contending that lack of
federal aid has led to increased reliance on imprisonment over policing).
60 The product of many such moves in substantive and procedural law may be a system
that strikes an acceptable balance on a net basis but that appears intellectually incoherent
in many respects. Cf. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW:  AN ESSAY
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The regulated actor’s efforts to lower the probability of sanction
are largely specific:  What she does to thwart the state’s efforts lowers
her probability of sanction but—except to the extent that her activities
compel the state to spread its policing resources more thinly—not the
probability that others will be sanctioned.  The state’s efforts to raise
the probability of sanction are largely general:  What it does to
respond to the regulated actor raises everyone’s probability of sanc-
tion, except to the extent that the state targets additional policing
resources at a particular individual or entity.  Under these conditions,
overbreadth inevitably results from the generality and, importantly,
the binding nature61 of legal rules articulated ex ante.62
D. Institutional Actors and Overbreadth
There is a missing link in my explanation of how efforts to avoid
the reach of liability rules can cause such rules to expand to a state of
overbreadth.  Who are the decisionmakers in the legal system who
respond to such pressures by broadening liability rules?  I might avoid
this question by positing a rational policymaker with full knowledge
and no susceptibility to agency costs in advancing social welfare.  But
this would not be realistic.  And it would do a poor job of situating my
argument within the literature on criminal law’s expansion, which is
intensely (and rightly) focused on the motives that legislators, prose-
cutors, and others have for growing the substantive criminal law.
There are good reasons to believe that the three legal actors with
the most influence over the shape of criminal liability rules—legisla-
tors, prosecutors, and judges—have strong tendencies to broaden lia-
bility rules in response to the difficulty of reaching certain criminal
behaviors.  This does not mean that agency costs among such actors
are insignificant.  As I will argue in Part III, the problem of over-
breadth should largely be conceived, as a normative matter, as a
IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (2006) (advancing severe critique of rationality of many eviden-
tiary and procedural doctrines in American law of criminal justice).
61 See SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 49 (discussing how rules are “entrenched,” meaning
that their commitments do not give way when confronted with specific cases that show
those commitments to be overbroad or underbroad).
62 Neal Katyal has shown that sanctioning efforts directed at one offense may lead to
increases in other offenses, as offenders substitute away from the more severely or more
frequently penalized crime.  Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2385, 2387 (1997).  Individuals may respond to deterrence efforts not just by choosing to
engage in alternative harmful activities but also by restructuring activities to counteract
deterrence efforts.  To return to the pit bull example, the hobbyists, in order to avoid pun-
ishment, have not substituted one kind of violation (ownership of innovative breeds) for
another (pit bull ownership).  Rather, they have reorganized their activity so that it cannot
be punished as pit bull ownership, causing the state to reorganize its law so that the activity
can be punished as ownership of aggressive dogs.
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problem of managing agency costs.  But failing to understand how
legal actors can expand liability rules to a state of overbreadth even
when they genuinely are striving to achieve social welfare objectives
can lead to the mistake of thinking that troubling excess in liability
rules could be eliminated simply by curtailing the ability of such actors
to hoard power.
1. Instrumental Agendas
Legislators. Accounts of the political economy of federal crim-
inal law often begin, sensibly, with the role of Congress in generating
criminal statutes.63  Such accounts usually assert that the legislative
process produces prohibitions that are too numerous and too broad in
the following way:  Given the prevailing political culture in the United
States, legislators fear losing votes for appearing “soft on crime.”  Vir-
tually no constituency or lobby, other than the occasional aggrieved
legislator,64 applies pressure for a law favoring the accused.  Whether
the impetus is public fretting over the crime “wave” of the moment
(often driven by media treatment of crime65) or executive branch
actors seeking expansion of their own powers,66 the response is the
same:  Vote yes.  At least at the federal level, legislators do not think
or care much about the after-effects of criminal legislation.67  Political
benefits are reaped, and prosecutors are left alone to enjoy the fruits
of this economy, in the form of increased powers exercised with ever-
dwindling scrutiny by judges and juries.68
63 See, e.g., Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It?, supra note 16, at 32–44 (describing
development of modern American “tough on crime” political culture and its connection to
punitive legislation).
64 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000) (applying state bar disciplinary rules to govern-
ment attorneys).  This provision, the McDade Amendment, was named for a member of
Congress who was subject to federal prosecution. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 208–15 (2000) (discussing
legislative history of § 530B).
65 See generally Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy:
How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006).
66 Stuntz, supra note 16, at 533–35, 537–38.
67 See Stuntz, supra note 38, at 844 (“Senators and Representatives use criminal law
and sentencing doctrine to send messages, not to define prohibited conduct and its
deserts.”). But see Richman, supra note 38, at 789 (“Congress’s influence on enforcement
decisions is far greater than those whose criticism of its delegation has been based on the
absence of legislative specificity have recognized.”).
68 See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 100–16 (2005) (examining steep decline in trial acquittal rate
in federal system).  Daniel Richman has explained that federal criminal law enforcement is
regulated, informally and loosely, by unwritten bargains under which the executive branch
exercises restraint in order to avoid undesirable oversight proceedings, budgetary restric-
tions, appointments interference, and even amendment and curtailment of procedural
rules.  Richman, supra note 38, at 789–805; see also Brown, supra note 18, at 257–58 (dis-
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As I will discuss in Part II, the federal legislative record often
includes evidence that lawmakers and enforcers, when making liability
rules, worry about particularly thorny problems of behavior control
that are perceived to demand flexible legal tools.  It nonetheless
remains true that Congress is a willing partner with the executive
branch in the expansion of substantive criminal law.  The legislature
provides a weak check on the growth of liability rules.  Even assuming
that Congress is an open gateway to overbreadth in liability rules,
however, one still needs an explanation of what drives expansion of
liability rules at either side of the legislative portal.  Why do enforcers
urge legislators to enact broader liability rules?  Why do enforcers
urge courts to interpret liability rules broadly?  And why do courts
accommodate enforcers’ efforts?
Prosecutors. Prosecutors exert enormous influence over the path
of substantive criminal law.  By virtue of their institutional function as
screeners and initiators of cases, prosecutors literally set the agenda
for the criminal justice system.69  By virtue of the absence of law regu-
lating their selection and initiation of cases, and the elusiveness of any
feasible such regulation,70 prosecutors are free to pursue almost limit-
less agendas in the enforcement of criminal law.  Breadth in criminal
liability rules may be generated cyclically:  Broader liability rules
afford prosecutors more freedom to apply them to novel contexts,
generating more cases that require courts to decide whether to inter-
pret liability rules broadly, and so on.71
cussing use of budgetary controls to affect how prosecutors enforce criminal liability rules).
Darryl Brown has shown that the simple political-economy story about criminal legislation
also fails to capture the behavior of state legislators, who might be expected to be subject
to the same incentives as members of Congress but who often refuse to expand the scope
of substantive criminal law when presented with proposed legislation. Id. at 245–49.
69 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 479–80 (1996) (describing prosecutorial power to set agenda by screening
cases that enter criminal justice system); Richman, supra note 38, at 763 (discussing
“extraordinary degree of discretionary authority” provided to federal enforcers); Ronald
F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on
Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1936–37 (2006) (same).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–25 (1979) (declining to regu-
late prosecutor’s selection of charges in initiating criminal case); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 362–65 (1978) (declining to regulate use of threats of more severe punish-
ment to induce plea bargains).
71 The less subject to legal controls and the more expansive is prosecutorial power, the
less amenable such power seems to theoretical analysis. See Ronald Wright & Marc
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 55 (2002) (“Legal scholars
rarely discuss the internal administration of justice agencies.”).  There has been some
recent progress. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003) (supplying in-depth analysis of incen-
tives and relationships operating between law-enforcement agents and prosecutors);
Wright & Engen, supra note 69 (conducting empirical examination of relationship between
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The literature on the contemporary expansion of criminal law has
stressed, perhaps at the expense of a more complex account of
prosecutorial motivation, the agency costs that prosecutors can will-
ingly impose on society.  Sometimes the prosecutor has been
presented in a thin behavioral model as a political actor who maxi-
mizes her particular forms of wealth.72  The wealth menu includes free
time and low stress generated by the disposal of most or all cases
through plea bargaining; promotion and compensation benefits gener-
ated by high conviction rates;73 and prestige and quantitative perform-
ance measures that lead to lucrative private sector opportunities,
generated by high conviction rates as well as victories (and perhaps
just trial experience) in high-profile cases that do not plead.74
Two legal phenomena are said to be necessary in order to gen-
erate these forms of wealth.  First, defendants must have strong incen-
tives to plea bargain, allowing prosecutors to maintain high conviction
rates and avoid labor-intensive trials.  Second, substantive and proce-
dural law must be highly favorable to prosecutors, allowing them to
win almost all of the cases that do go to trial and to bring indictments
in high-profile cases that might otherwise be too legally marginal to
support charge or conviction.75  In their self-interest, prosecutors
therefore continually pressure legislators and courts to broaden lia-
bility rules.76  The two phenomena are linked, since looseness in pro-
cedural and substantive law is likely to increase the rate of plea
bargaining.77  The implications of this picture are troubling:  Not only
might criminal justice not be administered impartially, but a system
depth of criminal code and prosecutorial charging practices); Wright & Miller, supra, at
67–84 (conducting empirical examination of prosecutorial screening and plea bargaining
practices).
72 E.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  An Analysis of the
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259 (2000).
73 Stuntz, supra note 16, at 535–38.
74 Glaeser et al., supra note 72, at 262–66.  The wealth menu might also include fruits of
corruption. See Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of
Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 72–76 (2007) (arguing that criminal proce-
dure law serves purpose of constraining rent-seeking by prosecutors, such as seeking “to
benefit themselves by selling their power to enforce the criminal law to the highest
bidder”).
75 As Ronald Wright observes, the different components of this story sometimes point
in contradictory directions:  Prosecutors try too few cases to maximize leisure time but also
try too many to generate marketable experience.  Wright, supra note 68, at 95–96.
76 Stuntz, supra note 16, at 544.
77 See Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver:  A Survey of Possible
Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155, 1156–61 (2005) (reiterating and summarizing
common refrain in criminal law scholarship on relationship between broadening legal rules
and plea bargaining); Stuntz, supra note 16, at 519–20 (discussing the connection between
broader laws and increased plea bargaining rates).
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dominated by plea bargaining and nearly devoid of acquittals can seri-
ously distort the accuracy of outcomes.78
But this is not the whole story.79  Prosecutors may maximize
things other than their own wealth.  They are lawyers and thus have
been conditioned to think of themselves as functionaries in a public
system.  Among lawyers, they are part of a group declining higher-
paying positions in the private sector for lower-paying government
jobs, presumably because they believe they might accomplish some-
thing useful in the public interest.80  Thus, they should be expected not
just to enhance their own wealth but also to seek out problems of a
public nature and see if they might use legal tools to address them.81
None of this is to say that prosecutors are necessarily right or that
their actions are necessarily beneficial.  The point is simply that their
motivations should be expected to include ones that are social
regarding even if their actions sometimes, or even frequently, prove
misguided.82
Some observers have worried particularly about what happens
when one combines a prosecutor’s interests in wealth-maximization
78 Wright, supra note 68, at 84–86.  Another cost might be, as in the Al Capone sce-
nario, the reduction in transparency and public oversight that results when prosecutors,
free to choose from long lists of substantive offenses in overly redundant codes, charge
violations that do not represent the true nature of the wrongdoing or the justifications for
prosecution.  Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge:  An Essay on
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86, 608–18
(2005).
79 Daniel Richman has illustrated the inadequacy of a simple rational self-interest
model of prosecutorial behavior in his exploration of the incentives and relationships oper-
ating between prosecutors and law-enforcement officers.  Richman, supra note 71.
80 See Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:  A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 219–20 (1988)
(criticizing public choice theorists for misunderstanding and oversimplifying motivations of
people who choose public service careers); Richman, supra note 38, at 779 (arguing that
self-interest model of prosecutor fails to consider ideological motivations that may draw
prosecutor to job).
81 As far as I know, the only empirical study to address this point is Glaeser et al., supra
note 72.  The authors found significant positive relationships between drug offenders’
wealth, education, whiteness, use of private counsel, and involvement in trafficking (as
opposed to possession) and their likelihood of prosecution in federal, rather than in state,
court.  As the authors concede, their results plausibly support two hypotheses:  Federal
prosecutors prefer to select resource-rich and more sophisticated offenders either in order
to generate more marketable trial experience and disseminate their reputations or because
the superior legal and fiscal resources available in federal court make the imposition of
sanction on such offenders more likely there than in state court, thus furthering social
welfare. Id. at 270 tbl.2, 273, 288.
82 But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 50–51 (1988) (suggesting that benefits to prosecutor of wealth-
maximizing in various forms are more immediate and tangible than deterrence benefits of
prosecution).
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with the degree of docket control that federal prosecutors enjoy.83
The concern may be warranted.  But one should also consider what
can happen when a prosecutor’s interest in addressing problems of
public importance is joined with a high degree of independence,
resources, and agenda control.84  This combination is likely to produce
an influential legal actor who, when faced with efforts by regulated
actors to avoid imposition of sanction, has the motive and means to
counteract such efforts by interpreting and applying liability rules
broadly.
In a simplified example, the dynamic works like this.  Suppose
that it is an offense for a public official to take a bribe.  This offense
requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the exis-
tence of a quid pro quo—something like a contractual agreement
between the official and the bribe-giver that the official will take an
action in return for the bribe.  A county sheriff has run a corrupt and
impregnable political machine for decades, doling out wasteful con-
tracts in exchange for campaign contributions and pleasure goods and
services for him and his employees.  Recognizing the nature of the
bribery prohibition and having had years to institutionalize his prac-
tices, the sheriff operates this system without discussing any quid pro
83 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 3, at 14 (arguing that enormous power of federal prose-
cutors over charging and plea bargaining effectively makes them judges in their own
causes); Brown, supra note 18, at 259–60 (worrying about risk of prosecutorial abuses in
federal system given breadth of many substantive liability rules); Stuntz, supra note 16, at
543 (arguing that federal prosecutorial powers give prosecutors greater opportunity to use
office to enhance reputations and career prospects).  State and federal prosecutors are very
different legal actors. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 78, at 599–618.  State prosecutors
are largely reactive and beholden to electoral politics.  They generally deal with the cases
that the police bring to them.  The public expects them to process the great majority of
cases that generate the reportable crime statistics within their jurisdictions.  State prosecu-
tors have the power to select charges and to decline to prosecute, of course, but they other-
wise exercise relatively little influence over case initiation. Id. at 600–05.  Federal
prosecutors are largely proactive and insulated from electoral politics.  They are not
expected or required to act on any particular categories of cases, except a few like major
acts of espionage and terrorism, serious offenses on federal lands, and direct intrusions on
federal government functions. Id. at 608–15; see also Clymer, supra note 16, at 649, 652–54
(stating that there is little direction “to guide federal prosecutors in exercising their discre-
tion to choose among offenders eligible for federal prosecution” and listing categories of
cases that federal prosecutors may choose to prosecute).  Because they do not face the
same docket pressure as state prosecutors and because they enjoy access to the federal
treasury, federal prosecutors both set their own agendas and have the time and the
resources to engage cases at the earliest investigative stages.  In an era of minor jurisdic-
tional constraints on federal criminal law, the field over which they range is enormous.
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:  Advantages
of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095–98 (1995).
84 See Wright & Miller, supra note 71, at 49, 54 (arguing that, however accurate, criti-
cisms of prosecutorial discretion have missed potential benefits of case screening as regula-
tory device).
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quo with anyone, or perhaps without even meeting directly with the
people who supply benefits to him and his associates in exchange for
government contracts.  The elected state prosecutor in the jurisdiction,
a political ally of the sheriff, has no interest in roiling these waters.
Seeing no other way to stop the corrupt sheriff, the local federal
prosecutor decides to pursue a novel legal theory:  The sheriff has
been defrauding his constituents by depriving them, in a deceptive
manner, of their right to have their government allocate the fisc solely
in the public interest and without self-dealing.  Provided that a court
accepts the argument that the sheriff’s conduct violates a broadly
worded antifraud statute, the prosecutor has solved the dilemma of
how to stop the elusive corrupt sheriff.85  But the prosecutor’s actions
have produced an overbroad law.  However unlikely a prosecutor
might be to bring such a case, the fraud statute could be used on this
interpretation to prosecute a legislator for voting against a new
banking regulation after taking a lawful contribution from the banking
lobby.86
This dynamic that produces overbreadth is likely to be more pow-
erful the more prosecutors tend to select for prosecution regulated
actors who invest effort and resources in evading sanction.87  Among
all actors in the legal system, enforcers are closest to and most knowl-
edgeable about the state of the art among regulated actors.88  Prosecu-
85 Roderick Hills worries that overly intrusive federal prosecution of local government
corruption may undesirably skew systems of political accountability that are beneficial in a
federal structure of government.  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism:
(When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-federal Democracy?, 6 THEORET-
ICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 115 (2005); see also FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS,
THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY:  HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERN-
MENT INEFFECTIVE 174–85 (1996) (generally questioning whether criminal prosecution of
government corruption increases net benefits of government to public).  Hills’s concern,
however, is the extension into local governance of overly demanding norms about conflicts
of interest, not the effective enforcement of prohibitions on core corruption.  Hills, supra,
at 121–22, 128–29, 137–44.  In any event, it is not the point of my example to argue for a
particular position on how much corruption to criminalize.
86 See O’Sullivan, supra note 16, at 664.
87 For one federal prosecutor’s description of how this process operates in the partic-
ular sphere of efforts against violent gangs, see Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically:
How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (1999).
For an entertaining and illuminating memoir of another federal prosecutor’s journey
through this process, see JOHN KROGER, CONVICTIONS:  A PROSECUTOR’S BATTLES
AGAINST MAFIA KILLERS, DRUG KINGPINS, AND ENRON THIEVES (2008).  The author is
now a professor at Lewis & Clark Law School.
88 The courts frequently reiterate this point when they decline to adopt procedural
rules permitting searching judicial review of charging and plea decisions and similar execu-
tive branch functions in criminal law. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
464 (1996) (raising high hurdles to defendants seeking to obtain dismissal of indictments on
grounds of selective prosecution, in part because judiciary is ill-equipped to review
prosecutorial charging decisions); see also Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discre-
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tors are the most likely actors to perceive impediments to sanctioning
in existing law and to discover and initiate incremental moves that
broaden liability rules in order to overcome those impediments.  The
more successful an actor is at structuring conduct to avoid sanctioning,
the more aggressive a prosecutor will want to be in pushing for new
laws and new interpretations of existing laws to counteract the regu-
lated actor’s efforts.
Judges.  The literature on modern criminal law’s expansion—par-
ticularly the expansion of federal criminal law—has greatly under-
played the role of the courts.89  When Congress enacts open-textured
criminal prohibitions (the very sort of laws produced by the drive for
flexible regulatory tools), much substantive criminal law work is left
for the courts.  Courts engage in constitutional policing, using legality
doctrines such as the rule of lenity and prohibitions on unduly vague
criminal statutes and ex post facto lawmaking.90  Much more often,
federal courts interpret statutes, issuing thousands of rulings on the
scope of federal criminal prohibitions.  Because these decisions are
made in adversarial litigation between prosecutors and defendants,
they nearly always require a choice between a broader or narrower
reading of a criminal statute that will include or exclude certain con-
duct.  The Supreme Court does a little of this work, but the vast
majority of it occurs in the federal courts of appeals.  As many have
argued, it is an illusion to treat this judicial activity as anything other
than criminal lawmaking.91
The courts’ weak enforcement of constitutional legality doctrines
is well documented.92  But the posture of the federal courts in cases of
tion:  Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 387, 398 (2008) (describing courts’ reluctance to review prosecutorial
decisionmaking).
89 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 16, at 510 (arguing that judges “who alone are likely to
opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader ones”  are marginalized in development
of criminal law). But see Clymer, supra note 16, at 656–68 (describing and critiquing role
of judges in broadening liability rules); Smith, supra note 16, at 884 (same).
90 See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610–21 (2003) (discussing Ex Post Facto
Clause doctrine); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) (dis-
cussing rule of lenity); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (discussing vague-
ness doctrine).
91 See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2006)
(characterizing fraud as common law crime); Kahan, supra note 69, at 471–79 (describing
federal criminal law as common law by judicial implementation of open-textured statutes);
O’Sullivan, supra note 16, at 667 (same); see also United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020,
2031 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“When Congress fails to define potentially ambig-
uous statutory terms, it effectively delegates to federal judges the task of filling gaps in a
statute.”).
92 See Jeffries, supra note 33, at 195–201; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 344–45, 348 & tbls.4,
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criminal statutory interpretation is understudied.93  The Supreme
Court’s work in this area can be misleading.  In a handful of decisions,
mostly involving marginal criminal activity, the Court has narrowed
federal criminal law.94  These cases have generated a scholarly litera-
ture.95  But the Court’s decisions represent a fraction of the activity of
the federal courts in this area.  In recent years, the Court has said little
of great consequence to criminal cases about the scope of bulwark
statutes such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) or the mail fraud and securities fraud prohibitions.96
Most of the content of these statutes is supplied by the courts of
appeals, whose work in this area has produced much substantive
expansion of federal criminal law.
7 (1991) (documenting how Congress legislatively overrides Supreme Court decisions most
often in criminal law and, there, almost always in favor of government’s position—perhaps
explaining in part why courts have infrequently struck down federal criminal statutes).
93 An exception to the overcriminalization literature’s tendency to give short shrift to
the judiciary’s role is Smith, supra note 16, at 884, which asserts that federal judges are not
“innocent bystanders” and “have been all too willing to construe federal crimes expan-
sively . . . .”  Smith finds it puzzling that the federal judiciary tends to interpret ambiguous
statutes broadly, id. at 893, and he argues that the tendency can be corrected by persuading
courts to adopt different interpretive strategies, id. at 930–49.  Smith describes a compul-
sion of federal courts to “view themselves as having an obligation to ensure that no morally
blameworthy defendant ever slips through the federal cracks.” Id. at 884.  He attributes
this compulsion to the press of case-specific adjudication, in which judges must interpret
statutes while confronting blameworthy offenders whom they cannot tolerate seeing
escape punishment. Id. at 925.  But if, as Smith suggests, judges can interpret statutes as
broadly as necessary to punish blameworthy offenders but not further, then judges would
not produce overbreadth.
94 See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) (requiring proof of addi-
tional mens rea element under statute regulating dealing in firearms without proper
license); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994) (requiring proof of additional
mens rea element under statute regulating illegal currency deposits); Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 201–03 (1991) (requiring proof of additional mens rea element in
prosecution for criminal tax evasion).
95 See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness:  An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998); Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit
the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753 (2002); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason
of Blamelessness:  Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021
(1999).
96 The Court’s last major ruling on the substantive crime of mail fraud was in 1987.
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).  More recently, the Court ruled on the
peripheral question of whether a state license could be considered “property” for purposes
of the mail fraud statute.  Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000).  The Court
has ruled on the RICO statute in the criminal context principally in two cases, United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), and Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).  Of course,
the Court has interpreted the RICO statute numerous times in deciding issues relating to
civil lawsuits under the statute. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533
U.S. 158 (2001); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000).  In the securities fraud context, the
Court’s recent work has been exclusively in the realm of the private right of action for
securities fraud. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499
(2007).
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Public choice pressures cannot explain the federal courts’ hesi-
tancy to strike down criminal statutes as violating legality-related doc-
trines or the frequency with which the courts expansively interpret
statutory language.  One might blame this lack of assertiveness on
weak constitutional doctrine in the area of substantive criminal law.97
But this seems like a marginal impediment:  If federal judges wish to
narrow the scope of liability rules, they have the more easily deployed
tool of statutory interpretation.
Another explanation for expansive rulings might be that the fed-
eral courts are ideologically slanted in favor of criminal prosecutions:
Judges—all of them appointed by presidents who campaigned on law-
and-order themes and a large number of them former federal prosecu-
tors—might adopt prosecution-favoring interpretations of statutes
because they wish to see offenders sternly punished.  This is too sim-
plistic.  Some judges may believe in “locking them up and throwing
away the key,” but that is probably an unfair caricature of all but a
few appellate judges.  A judge is more likely to be interested in facili-
tating punishment—especially if she has ground-level experience as a
former prosecutor—when she believes that the narrower of two statu-
tory interpretations would permit socially harmful activity to escape
sanction in the case at hand, in future cases, or in both.
If a simple political economy explanation were true, one would
expect statutory interpretation practices in federal criminal cases to
correlate with ideology measures.98  The more conservative the judges
on a circuit court, the more one would expect the court’s rulings to tilt
in the direction of broader readings of statutes, and vice-versa.  As I
will explain in Part II, however, the ideological profile and track
record in statutory interpretation of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit falsify this claim.  One might deny that
conservative ideology should be expected to correlate with expansive-
ness in substantive criminal law rulings.99  But this assertion proves
97 See Stuntz, supra note 16, at 559–65 (illustrating how existing constitutional doc-
trines dealing with lenity and vagueness fail to limit breadth of substantive criminal law).
98 For recent examples of relevant methodologies and questions of interest in the anal-
ysis of federal judicial politics, see Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme
Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007), Nancy
Staudt et al., On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Consti-
tutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361 (2008), and William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:  A Statistical Study (Univ. of Chi. Law School, John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 404, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=
1126403.
99 Compare, for example, the records of Justices Scalia and Stevens on such matters.
Compare Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 722–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(critiquing majority for failing to construe federal mail fraud statute more narrowly), with
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362–66 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (critiquing
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the point:  If liberal judges who tend to rule more frequently for
accused persons on points of criminal procedure also tend to adopt
broad interpretations of criminal statutes, they must have an agenda
for the substantive criminal law other than helping prosecutors incar-
cerate more people with less effort.
Another explanation for judges’ behavior is that they too respond
to the pressure that strategic actors exert on the regulatory system.100
Looking backward, appellate judges are likely to be moved by the
dangerousness and moral culpability of the offender and conduct that
gave rise to the case.  If prosecutors tend to select threatening actors
for sanction under broad liability rules, judges, seeing the serious
wrongs that narrow interpretations of rules would exclude from sanc-
tioning regimes, will resist narrow rulings.101  Looking forward, the
posture of the appellate judge is to seek a legal rule that will work in
unseen cases that might follow the one before the court.  Choosing the
broader interpretation of a statute lowers the risk that a serious case
arising in the future will be unreachable by the liability rule.  This
majority for failing to construe federal mail fraud statute more broadly).  It is well known
that judicial concern about the expansion of federal criminal law is not limited to those on
the ideological left. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Fed-
eral Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.),
Jan. 1999, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan99ttb/january1999.html (advocating
restriction of jurisdiction of federal courts over state crimes); see also Cornell W. Clayton
& J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice:  How the New Right Regime Shaped
the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1409–10 (2006)
(describing recent fissures on right over criminal justice between traditional advocates of
punitive policies and libertarians who fear excessive government powers).
100 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO:  The Crime of Being a Criminal (pt. 1), 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 666 (1987) (“Even assuming that judges, unlike legislatures, are immune to the
effects of public clamor to do something about crime (not necessarily an accurate assump-
tion), the internal pressure on judges to affirm convictions for serious crimes must be
enormous.”).
101 Frederick Schauer worries that this judicial tendency—the susceptibility of case-
specific adjudication to being skewed by the “availability heuristic”—is a deep flaw in the
idea of relying on a common law process to develop legal rules.  Frederick Schauer, Do
Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 890–901 (2006).  Whether Schauer is cor-
rect is an empirical question, the answer to which would require considering, among other
things, the relative ability of legislators to forecast accurately the contours of the mine run
of cases a statute is intended to reach.  Schauer worries that judges developing law through
a common law process may make an additional mistake:  All legal rules are unavoidably
underinclusive and/or overinclusive, but judges are apt to think that any occasion of a law
missing its intended mark is proof that the law is deficient.  Judges thus may tend to over-
adapt law through adjudication, causing it to reach a suboptimal state. Id. at 907–08.  If
Schauer is correct in asserting that judges have a hard time knowing when to be genuinely
concerned that a particular case falls outside the letter of a legal rule though within its
spirit and intent, then we would need some criteria for determining whether a legal rule
that misses its mark has seriously underperformed or merely inevitably fallen a bit short.
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1523
pressure would exist even in cases involving marginal actors as to
whom a prohibition might seem overbroad.102
Federal prosecutors’ and federal judges’ behaviors tend to rein-
force each other.  Prosecutors with a high degree of agenda control
and resources are both able and inclined to focus efforts on harm-
producing actors who are most difficult to sanction.  When those pros-
ecutors bring the cases of such actors before appellate judges for the
purpose of arguing about the scope of liability rules, judges are both
moved by the facts to allow punishment of those offenders and moved
by their posture as appellate judges to define liability rules in a
manner that allows for punishment of similar offenders in the future.
When prosecutors walk away from such litigation with more broadly
defined liability rules in hand, they will be inclined to use those more
pliable rules to reach additional harm-producing actors who appear
particularly remote from sanctioning efforts.
The cycle continues until it reaches a state in which criminal
prohibitions are broad enough to permit sanctioning of persons who
do not produce the serious harms that gave rise to the liability rule in
the first place.  Similar reinforcement likely exists in the relationship
between prosecutors and legislators:  Prosecutors’ tendency to use the
broad tools legislators give them to attack the most sophisticated,
organized, and harmful offenders leaves legislators with little reason
to reconsider the breadth of liability rules.103  We thus end up with
substantial overbreadth in liability rules, producing at least the poten-
tial agency cost of prosecutors choosing to use serious criminal
prohibitions in cases for which harsh punishments are not justified.
2. Motivating Norms
The theoretical account I have supplied can be made more sym-
pathetic by taking it to a deeper level.  Legal actors are human beings
with complex normative systems, not simply regulatory instruments
who make expected value calculations.  The drive to sanction the most
elusive violators, and the legal overbreadth it produces, might arise
from and explain a feature of political culture in the United States.
Public enforcers might be motivated by a norm that it is unacceptable
that one’s resources and industriousness could place one beyond the
reach of regulation.
102 Of course, this assumes appellate judges tend to think that missing a future case of
harm is more costly than including a future case that might be marginal.  This assumption
seems fair.  In the former instance, a grave social harm might go unanswered; in the latter,
someone might end up with too much punishment for doing something wrong but not
seriously blameworthy.
103 Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2028–29.
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On this account, actors who are sophisticated about avoiding
sanctioning regimes have a turbo-charging effect on the growth of lia-
bility rules.  Instrumentally, their efforts cause legal actors to expand
rules to counteract such efforts.  On top of that, individuals’ commit-
ment to evasion makes legal actors perceive such persons as posing
the greatest normative threat to legal regimes.  Legal actors thus con-
centrate their regulatory efforts on those actors, fueling the cycle of
evasion and overbreadth.104
This drive to control the evasive actor might, perhaps surpris-
ingly, arise from commitments to the rule of law and to equality.  Usu-
ally we think of the elusive concept of the rule of law as encompassing
beliefs about how the state is to treat the individual:  clear, prospec-
tive articulation of law, nondiscriminatory enforcement, and so on.105
But it is also possible to see the rule of law as encompassing principles
about what the state owes a person when it administers the law with
respect to others.106  H.L.A. Hart expressed this when he observed:
[S]ubmission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were
no organization for the coercion of those who would then try to
obtain the advantages of the system without submitting to its obliga-
tions.  “Sanctions” are therefore required not as the normal motive
for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily
obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not.  To obey,
without this, would be to risk going to the wall.107
Although he was speaking of law generally, Hart’s point is partic-
ularly applicable to societies characterized by high levels of legal com-
pliance and a strong commitment to the rule of law.  In such
conditions, a public perception that the state is fully committed to
enforcement against those who seek with the greatest determination
to escape common obligations helps to maintain high levels of rule-of-
law commitment and compliance.  To ask for legal compliance from its
citizens, the state must perform on a promise to those citizens that
104 Dennis Jacobs, the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, recently lamented what he
described as his colleagues’ immodest determination to find solutions in law, no matter the
complexity and expense of such solutions, for every pressing social problem that comes
before them.  Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855,
2855–58 (2007).
105 See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 1, at 79–81 (describing rule-of-law values in criminal
law).
106 Cf. Buell, supra note 91, at 2022–28 (arguing that in addition to being principle that
restrains state, legality principle’s requirement of notice can be understood as basis for
individual fault, since persons who violate rules while on notice are persons who deliber-
ately choose to do wrong).
107 HART, supra note 31, at 198.
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1525
limiting their own liberty will benefit them—and will benefit them all
equally.108
When acting on this norm, the state does not necessarily sanction
in order to deter the most determined actors.  The state may be aware
that such an effort is fruitless.  Rather, the state acts to fortify the
perception that the social environment is one in which refusal to par-
ticipate in largely voluntary compliance is costly.109  Just as an invest-
ment market might unravel with the perception that cheating is
widespread, a “market” for legal compliance might collapse upon a
loss of faith that evasion comes at a cost.  In game-theoretic terms,
salient enforcement action against the most determined defectors
maintains the belief among those inclined to cooperate in conditions
of reciprocity that others who are similarly inclined, and who have
observed the same enforcement action, can be expected to continue to
cooperate rather than defect.
Consider also an equality dimension to the effort to control the
evasive actor.  As James Whitman has shown, one can see a powerful
“leveling-down drive” in the development of Anglo-American (as dis-
tinct from Continental) criminal justice.110  In Whitman’s account,
much of the recent growth in punishment severity in the United States
and England is traceable to the “degradation” function of punish-
ment, which involves the use of punishment to lower the social status
of the offender in response to the offender’s wronging of others.111
Whitman sees punishment as serving this function in a variety of con-
texts, including the increasing tendency to punish white-collar
offenders with imprisonment in heavy doses.112  Other commentators
have called attention to selective enforcement as an equality problem,
not just as to those against whom the law is enforced, but also as to
those against whom it is not.113
108 William Edmundson calls this the principle of fairness. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON,
THREE ANARCHICAL FALLACIES:  AN ESSAY ON POLITICAL AUTHORITY 111 (1998).
109 See generally WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (examining relation-
ship between voluntary tax compliance and enforcement); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of
Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (describing
“logic of reciprocity” in voluntary legal compliance and importance of promoting public
trust to achieve desired regulatory outcomes).
110 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
111 Id. at 6–7, 11, 19–20, 170–77, 191–94.  Whitman traces this leveling impulse to the
punishment theories of Beccaria and his Enlightenment contemporaries. Id. at 42, 51–53.
112 Id. at 43–49.
113 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“[T]he prin-
cipal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not over-
enforcement but underenforcement . . . .”); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2006) (“By failing to maintain an atmosphere of legality,
law enforcement turns its back on victim classes twice:  first, by denying them material
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From the state’s perspective, the perceived problem with permit-
ting resourceful actors to except themselves from sanctioning regimes
is two-fold, and both elements connect to the expressive function of
law:114  Neglect in enforcement risks communicating that a person’s
voluntary compliance is both foolish (because others appear to enjoy
the benefits of noncompliance without paying costs) and self-
denigrating (because society appears to privilege some who do not
comply over some who do—and worse, to privilege among all
noncompliant persons those with advantages).
No matter how egalitarian and idealistic the spirit behind pursuit
of the sanction-resistant violator may be, it can produce, as Whitman
and others have explored, costly, severe, and sometimes repellant
punishment practices.115  My point is simply that the drive to broaden
liability rules may be rooted in the social fabric, not just located at the
surface of politics and the regulatory process, and that its roots may
not be devoid of normative appeal.116
II
OVERBREADTH IN DOCTRINE
Turning to empirical inquiry, I will now examine four areas of
criminal activity to illustrate how competition between the state and
evasive actors generates overbreadth:  racketeering, money laun-
dering, obstruction of justice, and fraud.  These areas involve broad
rules that are made broader by the efforts of prosecutors and courts
and that are often deployed against resourceful actors.  In some of
these examples, one can observe a direct pattern of move and coun-
termove between lawmaker and violator.  In all of them, one can see
that regulators target actors who present severe challenges to sanc-
tioning regimes by generating breadth in liability rules due to a per-
ceived need for flexibility in dealing with such actors.
protective resources, and second, by depriving them of a robust, responsive legal system.”);
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 78, at 613 (“Th[e] extreme disjunction between federal
jurisdiction and federal resources has bred a norm of radical underenforcement.”); see also
Sarat & Clarke, supra note 88 (exploring prevalence and theoretical significance of
prosecutorial power not to charge).
114 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–22 (describing how criminal law can
shape preferences of citizens through messages it sends).
115 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 20, at 102; WHITMAN, supra note 110.
116 For an opposing view that current United States legal culture should be severely
faulted, on Christian precepts, for its determination to redress all social ills, see David A.
Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 809, 809–19 (2006).
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My doctrinal inquiry is confined to federal criminal law.  I make
this choice because the federal system supplies abundant evidence of
the two phenomena at the core of this project:  expansion of law and
evasion efforts by regulated actors.  Most scholars agree that substan-
tive federal criminal law has grown exceptionally broad in recent
decades.117  And it is safe to say that one tends to see more of society’s
sophisticated and harmful actors prosecuted in federal, rather than in
state, court.
Because the vast majority of judge-made federal criminal law
originates in the courts of appeals,118 one must look below the
Supreme Court to develop a qualitatively useful understanding of fed-
eral criminal law.  Given the quantity of appellate case law, however,
one cannot deal with more than a single circuit in an article of this
sort.  I will focus on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals because it is
arguably the leading federal circuit court119 and is the most ideologi-
cally moderate one120—meaning it is the least likely to produce a
jurisprudence that can be explained simply by ideological politics of
crime.
A. Racketeering
Probably no sector of federal criminal law has grown more in
recent decades than RICO121 and related statutes.122  As Gerard
Lynch documented in the 1980s, RICO acquired a life of its own after
117 See sources cited supra note 16.
118 See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
119 See In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 127 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting pres-
tige of Second Circuit in commercial matters); James Oakes, Personal Reflections on
Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1995) (describing
Second Circuit’s development as prestigious court); Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours
of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 456 (2001) (describing
Second Circuit as “leading court for business disputes”).
120 Consider how the Second Circuit fares in one current measurement of federal judge
ideology, the Judicial Common Space (JCS) score.  A judge’s JCS score is a function of the
party affiliations and legislative records of the President and senators involved in the
judge’s appointment.  See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007).  The JCS data for the federal circuits is available at http://
epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html.  The JCS measure ranges from –1.0 (most
liberal) to 1.0 (most conservative).  Since 1988, the Second Circuit has been the most lib-
eral of the federal circuits, with most others ranking on the conservative side of the JCS
spectrum.  Its median JCS score ranged from –0.34 to 0.15 during the years 1988 through
2006.  This is the lowest score for all of the federal circuits during this period and, for many
of those years, is the only median score that was below the ideologically neutral score of
0.0.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1963 (2000).
122 See infra notes 148–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of leading related
statutes.
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its passage in 1970.123  Enacted to deal with a specific problem—infil-
tration of legitimate enterprises, such as labor unions, by traditional
organized crime—the law quickly became, after a period of little use,
an all-purpose tool for dealing with professional criminals in federal
court.124
The statute’s language and architecture made this expansion pos-
sible.  In its conceptual structure, RICO makes it a federal crime to
commit a series of certain kinds of federal or state crimes as part of a
continuing pattern connected to the operation of some form of organi-
zation.125  The “pattern” may consist of as few as two offenses.126  The
organization (what RICO calls an “enterprise”) may be legitimate,
illegitimate, or even one person’s criminal venture, and it need have
no particular hierarchy or structure.127  The statute also makes it a
crime to agree with another to engage in racketeering, even if no pat-
tern of offenses follows.128  Related statutes make it an offense to
commit a single murder or assault if the offender’s purpose is to get
into or stay in a criminal group129 or to cross state lines with the pur-
pose of establishing or carrying on any gambling business or of com-
mitting any extortion, bribery, or arson offense.130
At bottom, RICO and its kin are procedural devices, supported
by instrumental rationales.  The statutes allow the joinder of offenders
and offenses for prosecution in federal court and facilitate sanctioning
of individuals who exploit organizations and use team efforts to divide
labor in order to reduce the probability of sanctioning.  These statutes
are supported by many of the rationales that justify conspiracy liability
123 Lynch, supra note 100; Gerard E. Lynch, RICO:  The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts.
3 & 4), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1987).
124 Not only has Congress lodged no objection to the federal courts’ broad interpreta-
tions of the statute, but it periodically adds offenses to RICO’s laundry list of “racke-
teering acts”—for example, alien smuggling, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, § 433, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (2000))—strongly suggesting that Congress welcomes the statute’s use outside
the context of traditional organized crime.  Lynch, supra note 100, at 713.
125 In its technical terms, the statute makes it a crime for anyone who is “employed by
or associated with any enterprise” to “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (2000).  “Racketeering activity” is defined as any crime contained in a long list of
state and federal offenses. Id. § 1961(1).
126 Id. § 1961(5).
127 Id. § 1961(4); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589–91 (1981) (holding that
term “enterprise” in RICO statute includes illegitimate enterprises).
128 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62–66 (1997)
(holding that RICO conspiracy provision is violated as long as defendant agrees that some
person will commit at least two racketeering acts).
129 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000).
130 Id. § 1952.
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and its manifold doctrinal structure.131  In the absence of RICO,
requiring the prosecutor to prove in isolation each act committed by
each individual would increase the likelihood that a group of persons
engaged in a course of acts will succeed in avoiding sanction.132  Such
a requirement would produce an incentive to organize criminal activi-
ties in groups, with layers of hierarchy and division of labor.  RICO’s
logic, at least as the statute has come to be interpreted, is to reduce
this incentive.133
The story that Lynch told in the 1980s was only the beginning.  By
the end of the 1990s, RICO and related statutes were being used rou-
tinely in the Second Circuit, as elsewhere, to deal not only with infil-
tration of legitimate enterprises by traditional organized-crime groups
such as La Cosa Nostra but also with the activities of highly
resourceful offenders of infinite variety.  Prosecutions in the New
York metropolitan area alone targeted, for example, the owner of a
chain of gas stations who earned tens of millions of dollars by rigging
his pumps to overcharge customers and, in order to sustain his ten-
year scheme, bribed city inspectors and ordered underlings to murder
employees suspected of cooperating with authorities;134 a crack
cocaine–distribution organization known as the “Supreme Team” that
earned as much as $200,000 per day and whose leaders bribed parole
131 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1333–69 (2003)
(illustrating how conspiracy doctrine seeks to make organization of criminal activity in
group form less advantageous).  Katyal finds that federal conspiracy law, in contrast with
state law, has tended to adopt doctrinal permutations that are justified by the need to deal
with the tendencies of group criminality to evade sanctions. Id. at 1369.  This finding is
consistent with the federal criminal justice system’s tendency to concentrate on sanction-
resistant violators.
132 See Lynch, supra note 123, at 960 (“Respect for law is hardly fostered when the legal
system myopically focuses on isolated, perhaps minor, offenses of individuals whose entire
lives make plain their complete commitment to a career of organized lawbreaking.”).
133 See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1978) (asserting that RICO is
designed to deal with situations “when groups of people, through division of labor, special-
ization, diversification, complexity of organization, and the accumulation of capital, turn
crime into an ongoing business”).  In his seminal study, Gerard Lynch maintained that
RICO should be thought of as a novel, substantive criminal offense, not just a procedural
innovation.  Lynch, supra note 123, at 938–40.  But the features of RICO that Lynch identi-
fied as distinctive—its joinder, statute of limitations, double jeopardy, and sanctioning con-
sequences—are, however dramatic in effects, procedural characteristics.  By virtue of
RICO’s definition of “racketeering activity,” any violation of the statute must be predi-
cated on a defendant’s violation of freestanding criminal prohibitions that mark out what is
normatively wrongful about the defendant’s conduct.  Lynch maintained that, by requiring
a finding of an “enterprise” and a “pattern” of racketeering activity, RICO requires jurors
to reach a character judgment about the offender over time, a departure from the tradi-
tional transaction-based model of criminal adjudication. Id. at 944–45.  Even if this is true,
it represents an additional finding necessary for imposition of liability, not a substitute for
finding that the defendant engaged in specific criminal violations.
134 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2001).
1530 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1491
officials to obtain targeting information on witnesses and ordered at
least eight murders, including some to prevent potential witnesses
from disabling their operations;135 the leader of a sophisticated drug-
distribution organization known as the “Bebos” (after the dialect they
created to prevent outsiders from understanding them) who arranged
the infamous murder of a New York City police officer who was
guarding the home of a witness;136 a group led by an attorney and a
nightclub owner that trafficked marijuana between California, New
York, and Florida and committed a kidnapping and double-murder in
California;137 a narcotics-distribution, robbery, and credit-card fraud
organization (the “Nineties Posse”) comprising fraudulently docu-
mented immigrants who committed at least six murders in New York,
Los Angeles, and Miami, as well as a kidnapping-torture in Massachu-
setts;138 and a gang that controlled the retail crack trade in East New
York for nearly ten years, during which it wounded and killed
numerous people to protect its turf.139  Believe it or not, such cases
have become routine for the jurisdiction’s RICO docket; there have
been many more like them.
Three judicial moves, all featured in decisions of the Second Cir-
cuit, have been instrumental in RICO’s development as a flexible tool
for prosecution of the determined criminal actor.  First, the Supreme
Court decided that the “enterprise” envisioned by the statute could be
either a legal entity or an informal association of persons.140  The
Second Circuit and other lower courts have applied this ruling in a
manner that permits RICO prosecutions of loose-knit criminal
cohorts of all sorts.141
135 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 652–54 (2d Cir. 1997).
136 United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1995).
137 United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2002).
138 See Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 4–38, United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230,
2002 WL 34244994 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002).  I served as a prosecutor in this case.
139 See Brief for the Respondent-Appellee at 4–34, United States v. Mora, 152 F.3d 921
(2d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-1566), 1998 WL 398802.  I served as a prosecutor in this case.  The
group’s activities included detonating a grenade inside one grocery store, setting afire
another grocery store that burned an elderly man alive, and opening fire with machine
guns on a street corner, killing a young serviceman home on leave. Id. at 20–22, 29–30.
140 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–93 (1981); see also Cedric Kushner Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 166 (2001) (holding that individual defendant’s closely
held corporation can be treated as RICO enterprise even if defendant is sole proprietor);
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257–60 (1994) (holding that organi-
zation need not have economic purpose to be treated as RICO enterprise); Lynch, supra
note 100, at 706 (stating that after Turkette, RICO makes it criminal “to be a gangster”).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 672–73 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
members of “Patio Crew” gang constituted RICO enterprise because they sold drugs in
particular area pursuant to rules of conduct); United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 134, 144–45
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that drug-dealing group with layers of hierarchy and division of
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Second, the federal courts have interpreted RICO’s requirement
that a defendant have participated in an enterprise “through a pattern
of racketeering activity” to mean simply the commission of two or
more criminal acts that relate to each other and pose some possibility
of continuing.142  The Supreme Court announced this requirement of
“relatedness and continuity” among racketeering acts in a civil RICO
lawsuit.143  In criminal cases, however, the courts almost invariably
have found relatedness and continuity to be established merely by the
nature of repeated unlawful activity pursued by groups engaged in the
business of crime.144
Third, the courts have broadly interpreted RICO’s requirement
that a defendant have conducted or participated in the conduct of a
criminal enterprise’s affairs.145  Again, the Supreme Court dealt with
this element of the statute in a civil RICO case, in an effort to limit
the statute by excluding low-level actors from its scope.146  In criminal
cases, though, the Court’s ruling has been interpreted to mean that the
statute applies to all but the lowest-level members of an organization
who possess literally no authority to decide to commit an individual
offense.147
labor constituted RICO enterprise); United States v. Morales, 185 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir.
1999) (broadening RICO’s reach by noting that criminal organization can continue to func-
tion as illegal RICO enterprise even after members are incarcerated); United States v.
Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1560 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that “Westies” gang was RICO enter-
prise because members committed murder, loansharking, extortion, and drug dealing
offenses in hierarchical manner).
142 E.g., H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236–43 (1989).
143 Id. at 243.
144 See, e.g., United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 376 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
defendant’s commission of two murders and loansharking offense while member of
Luchese crime family satisfied pattern requirement); United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d
1102, 1114 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that effort to commit series of kidnappings over
fourteen-week period was sufficient to satisfy RICO’s pattern requirement); United States
v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1108 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant’s involvement in
bookmaking offense and extortion offense satisfied pattern requirement because both
offenses related to same criminal organization); United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 552
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding pattern requirement satisfied where motor vehicle registration
clerks processed multiple documents in exchange for bribes). But see United States v.
Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that evidence was insufficient to establish
that defendant’s shootings of victims were related to organized-crime enterprise as
opposed to personal matters relating to avoidance of loansharking debts); United States v.
Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697–98 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that RICO’s pattern requirement was
not satisfied by single crime plus subsequent effort to obstruct prosecution of that offense).
145 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
146 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177–85 (1993) (construing text to exclude
those who do not “participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself”).
147 The Second Circuit issued a number of decisions on this point. See United States v.
Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 98–100 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant may be convicted of
conspiracy to violate RICO without any showing of management authority or participation
in management of enterprise); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1999)
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Legislative and judicial moves to enable racketeering prosecu-
tions of individuals on the periphery of professional criminal groups,
or for whom evidence of core involvement might be weak, have
extended further.  In 1984, Congress enacted the Violent Crimes in
Aid of Racketeering (VCAR) statute, which punishes the commission
of a violent crime or a conspiracy to commit a violent crime “for the
purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in
an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity” or for compensation
from such an enterprise.148  When using this son-of-RICO law, the
government must still prove the existence of an enterprise in which
participants engaged in multiple crimes, but as to the defendant on
trial, it need only prove the commission of a single violent act.149
The Second Circuit has construed the motive element of this
statute broadly on the ground that Congress designed the law to sup-
plement RICO’s “remedial” scheme by facilitating federal prosecu-
tion of all violent crime related to organized criminal activity.150  If a
defendant had multiple purposes in committing an act of violence, the
government need only prove that one was the maintenance of some
status within an organization.151  The doctrine of transferred intent
and the felony-murder rule have been found to apply as well, meaning
that the statute can be used when gangsters injure innocent
(holding that members of “Latin Kings” gang who killed informant at direction of gang
leader, and independently decided to kill potential witness, satisfied Reves test for RICO
liability); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 672–73 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Reves
test for RICO liability was satisfied as to defendants involved in “Supreme Team” drug
gang who were responsible for supervising other workers in drug operation); United States
v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 696–97 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that Reves test was satisfied as to
member of “L.A. Boys” drug gang who served as intermediary to lower-level dealers and
participated in attempted murder of potential witness); Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d
680, 683 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Reves test was satisfied as to investigators who helped
produce evidence at direction of corrupt attorneys involved in fabricating personal injury
claims); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1373–74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that Reves
test was satisfied as to members of “Green Dragons” gang who committed extortions and
murders at direction of gang leaders). But see United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that no RICO liability could attach under Reves where defendant was
janitor and handyman who performed menial tasks at coffee company that was criminal
organization’s headquarters).
148 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, § 1002(a), 98 Stat.
1837, 2137 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000)); see also S. REP. NO.
98-225, at 304–05 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3483–84 (stating that
statute was enacted to further strong federal interest in combating violence linked to
organized criminal enterprises).
149 See United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d 285, 295–97 (2d Cir. 2003).
150 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 380–82 (2d Cir. 1992).
151 Id. at 381 (holding that motive element is satisfied if “jury could properly infer that
the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by
reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that
membership”).
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bystanders.152  This statute and its judicial construction have paved the
way for extensive efforts to address urban gang violence in federal
court.153  The very few cases in which the Second Circuit has rejected
prosecutions under this statute only prove this point, as they involve
individuals charged for acts of violence entirely unrelated to the busi-
ness of any relevant group.154
The result of all this prosecutorial and judicial expansion of
RICO and related statutes is overbreadth.  Some have complained
that RICO has grown “to subsume conspiracy law” and that it now
152 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 141–42 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying trans-
ferred intent doctrine); United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 334–36 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that prosecution under VCAR may be brought on felony-murder theory provided
that motive for underlying felony satisfies statute’s motive element).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 220–22 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming
conviction under VCAR relating to defendant crack dealer’s attempted murder to take
over another crack dealer’s enterprise); Pimentel, 346 F.3d at 295–97 (affirming VCAR
conviction for murder ordered by leader of “Netas” gang where victim was ejected gang
member who was threatening members of group); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635,
672 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming convictions for crimes charged under VCAR of owner of gas
station chain for ordering murders of employees and associates who might have revealed
pump-rigging scheme and other crimes); United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 113–14
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that violent crimes associated with “Los Solidos” gang in
Connecticut could be prosecuted under VCAR because gang distributed narcotics over
period of years, satisfying requirement that enterprise be engaged in racketeering activity);
Rahman, 189 F.3d at 126–27 (holding that member of jihadist group could be prosecuted
for killing rabbi because defendant increased his position in group by killing supporter of
Israel); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 94–96 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that persons asso-
ciated with “Latin Kings” gang could be prosecuted for murders of potential witness and
drug distributor who impinged on gang’s turf); Mapp, 170 F.3d at 334–36 (holding that
member of Brooklyn robbery gang could be prosecuted for killing patron in course of
committing bank robbery); United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 163–64 (2d Cir. 1997)
(affirming conviction relating to murder of unwitting bagel store clerk, where perpetrators
entered store with intention of locating and shooting members of rival organized-crime
group); United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 324, 340–41 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming murder
conviction in prosecution relating to “Unknown Organization” heroin operation because
defendant argued with look-out at drug spot before killing him and admitted dispute was
about drug spot).
154 See United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that gov-
ernment failed to support any theory on which organized-crime member’s killing of victim
could have been relevant to member’s standing within group); United States v. Desena,
260 F.3d 150, 153, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing conviction of motorcycle-gang member
who had committed arson after he had been ejected from gang); United States v. Ferguson,
246 F.3d 129, 134–37 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s reversal of VCAR conviction
of defendant prosecuted with members of South Bronx “Power Rules” gang because
defendant “was an outside hit man who did not belong to or seek to join Power Rules”);
United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 539–40 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing conviction of
defendant charged with committing murder for “Red Top Crew” drug organization
because no evidence established that defendant was member of group); United States v.
Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 817–19 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing VCAR conviction because no evidence
established that defendant’s motive for bombing restaurant was other than “purely merce-
nary,” as motive was unrelated to achieving or maintaining position in “Born to Kill”
organization).
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“subjects ordinary conspiracies to the same draconian penalty that
Congress crafted for organized crime.”155  It is not true that any con-
spiracy can be pled as a RICO violation:  A prosecutor must allege
and prove the commission of at least two predicate crimes.  But it is
true, for example, that two relatively amateurish criminals who
embark on a small spree involving a pair of gas station stick-ups could
be charged with violating RICO.  By and large, the Department of
Justice has kept a tight rein on use of the statute so as to prevent such
prosecutions from spurring Congress to revoke powers that the law
gives prosecutors.156  Still, some prosecutions raise questions about
whether RICO’s breadth sweeps in cases that do not involve the kinds
of threats to sanctioning regimes that justify the statute’s existence.157
There is considerable distance between the sophisticated organized
offender for whom the traditional tools of criminal law may be inade-
quate and the high-profile or otherwise tempting target who happens
to commit two or more crimes.  And prosecutions under the related
VCAR prohibition are not controlled so tightly, lifting some routine
cases of street crime into federal court.158
Narrowing these statutes—by, for example, dictating a larger
number of predicate crimes needed to establish a violation or
imposing minimum-revenue or quantity-of-personnel requirements
for a violation159—is not possible without substantial sacrifice in the
law’s ability to reach strategic actors.  Suppose that the Supreme
Court or the Second Circuit had interpreted RICO’s words “conduct
or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs”160  to
mean that the statute applied only to persons who occupied leadership
roles within criminal organizations.  This would have blocked the
155 Smith, supra note 16, at 912–13.
156 Cf. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-110.101 (2d
ed.  Supp. 2008) (requiring approval for any indictment charging RICO violation).  It may
also be true that prosecutors have declined to charge some potential RICO prosecutions
because the evidence was deemed insufficient to satisfy judicial interpretations of statutory
requirements such as “relatedness and continuity” among racketeering acts.
157 Some important examples come from outside of the Second Circuit. See United
States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 82–96 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming conviction of former mayor of
Providence, Rhode Island, for RICO conspiracy on basis of pattern of bribes accepted by
members of his administration); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1085, 1100, 1109
(10th Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal of indictment charging organizers of 2002 Salt Lake
City Olympic Games for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000) by making tuition, travel, and
other payments to members of International Olympic Committee).
158 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85–93 (D. Conn. 2003) (entering
judgment of acquittal after verdict in prosecution under VCAR in which defendant leader
of violent narcotics-trafficking enterprise murdered victim for “disrespecting” defendant’s
girlfriend).
159 Smith, supra note 16, at 918 n.96.
160 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
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practice of bringing multidefendant RICO cases against the full mem-
bership of a criminal group.  Such a move might have meant that
many of an organization’s members, including the ones that com-
mitted the most harmful offenses, would avoid sanctioning in federal
court.161  The inability to charge persons who directly committed crim-
inal acts for the organization at the behest of superiors would also
make it much more difficult to bargain with such persons for testi-
mony against their superiors—nearly always a necessary route to dis-
covering and proving the activities of higher-ups in clandestine
groups.162  This in turn would strengthen the incentives of an organi-
zation’s leaders to delegate acts to underlings and thicken the insula-
tion within criminal groups.163
With RICO, one does not observe direct evidence of an iterative
game in which criminal organizations altered their means of doing
business to avoid the effect of state-law prohibitions on violent crime,
followed by Congress’s enactment of RICO, followed by the restruc-
turing of criminal organizations to delegate conduct to lower-level
participants, followed by judicial decisions to construe RICO as
applying to lower-level participants, and so on.  But modern criminal
organizations, ranging from the Mafia to urban gangs, have invested
great effort in structuring their activities to reduce the probability of
sanctioning for a range of core criminal acts, such as murder.164  RICO
and related statutes, by facilitating the prosecution of multiple
offenses and offenders together in federal court, have significantly
increased the probability of successful sanctioning against persons
who plan criminal endeavors in the shadow of liability regimes.  Pros-
ecutors and courts have worked together to expand RICO doctrine to
make it effective against efforts of criminal groups to divide labor,
discourage group members from assisting law enforcement, and
161 As Lynch explains, the breadth of the statute’s language was in large part a result of
conceptual difficulties that the drafters encountered in defining “organized crime.”  Lynch,
supra note 100, at 685–88.
162 See Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2028–29 (arguing that federal statutes used against crim-
inal organizations are broad because they provide leverage to develop witnesses needed to
build such cases).
163 One might alternatively argue that RICO should be narrowed to constrain the
unwanted costs it may impose through its civil liability provisions. See, e.g., Norman
Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4, 8 (1989)
(proposing that government agency be given veto power over civil RICO lawsuits).  A
more fitting solution to this problem would be for Congress to decouple the elements of
civil liability under RICO from the elements of criminal liability.  It seems perverse to put
the courts in the position of having to narrow a statute principally designed for organized-
crime prosecutions just so that it does not afford too much leverage to plaintiffs suing
corporations in civil disputes.
164 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (describing incentives for criminal
groups to organize hierarchically to evade sanction).
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deploy other resources to thwart the process of evidence collection
and proof.  The result is a set of broad liability rules that, on their
terms at least, permit severe sanctioning in federal court of offenders
who may be no more threatening than the average recidivist.
B. Money Laundering
The evolution of money-laundering laws exemplifies how stra-
tegic criminal actors can push a legal regime toward overbreadth.  The
instrumental focus of money-laundering prohibitions can be under-
stood, at least in part, by way of the following example.  Suppose a
legal system has criminalized the distribution of heroin.  A wealthy
and successful heroin dealer with twenty employees has structured her
business so that once a month her pilot flies a plane to the United
States from a foreign country.  The plane is met by four of her
employees, who offload the heroin and then distribute it at different
locations to a dozen other employees.  These employees then sell it in
smaller amounts to independent retail dealers.  As the month’s busi-
ness unfolds, the proceeds from these heroin sales make their way
back up the chain to the four employees who offload the planes.  They
take their cut and then use the remaining cash to purchase real estate
in the name of the spouse of the heroin dealer, which the dealer can in
turn sell for profit.
Throughout this process, the dealer remains comfortably at
home, trading calls with realtors by poolside as she buys and sells real
estate and her bank account swells.  She never sees or touches any of
the heroin or its distributors.  She need only make a few discrete tele-
phone calls a month about logistics and be ready to deploy underlings
to commit acts of violence should anyone go astray.  As long as she
has done this once or twice in the recent past, it probably will not be
necessary.  Absent the improbable event of capturing one of her few
telephone calls on a wiretap, the authorities will likely be unable to
prosecute this person for violating the law against distributing heroin.
Authorities might arrest a lower-level organization member who
“flips,” but that testimony is unlikely to lead to conviction in the
absence of persuasive corroboration.165
As Congress and the Department of Justice figured out in the
1980s, there is another way to sanction the heroin dealer:  draft a law
that makes it a crime to do something like “engaging in a financial
transaction with the proceeds of heroin dealing, if one purpose of the
165 William Stuntz has explored the relative resources, risk tolerances, and exposure to
law enforcement of drug distributors, dealers, and purchasers.  William J. Stuntz, Race,
Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1808–09, 1812–13 (1998).
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transaction is to conceal that those proceeds have a criminal source.”
That is essentially the content of the principal federal money-
laundering statute.166  Now the government can sanction the dealer as
long as it can prove that she was a participant in the real estate trans-
actions (easy) and knew the source cash was criminally derived (a bit
harder but much easier than proving heroin distribution, because
extensive land holdings do not fall into a person’s lap).
But there is a problem with this legal rule.  It also makes a federal
criminal—one who might serve a lengthy sentence—out of a real
estate agent who looked away from the cash and characteristics of her
buyers when she brokered the sale of her client’s modest house to a
heroin dealer’s underlings.167  Indeed, it potentially makes a criminal
of a real estate agent who sold a house to a buyer who did not work
for such a heroin boss but was merely the corner marijuana dealer.
Congress passed the statute to deal with the elusive international
heroin boss.168  But the statute also covers the actor who gave no
thought to, indeed had no interest in, structuring her activities or oth-
erwise investing resources to evade sanctioning.  Only prosecutorial
discretion is left to sort the heroin boss from the realtor.169
A cycle of evasion and overbreadth characterizes money-
laundering regulation.  Federal law began by making it an offense for
a financial institution to conduct a cash transaction of $10,000 or more
without filing a report with the government.170  When banks proved
porous with respect to the filing of such reports, and persons engaged
in illicit activities devised means of circumventing the reporting
requirement, Congress broadened the statutory scheme in response to
the Department of Justice’s description of these vulnerabilities.171  Ini-
166 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000).  I have paraphrased the statute for clarity
and simplicity.
167 See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 856–59 (4th Cir. 1992) (reinstating
jury’s money-laundering conviction of North Carolina real estate agent for selling lake
house to drug dealer who drove flashy car and paid with cash in grocery bag).  Convictions
of such persons often implicate the doctrine of willful ignorance. See infra note 265 and
accompanying text.
168 See sources cited infra note 171.
169 Douglas Husak argues that money-laundering prohibitions are purely a case of over-
criminalization because transacting the profits of illegal conduct is not a further wrong to
profiting from illegal conduct. HUSAK, supra note 15, at 105.  I disagree.  Assuming a par-
ticular revenue-generating crime is wrongful, transacting its proceeds is a way of advancing
the commission of that wrong, sometimes in an essential manner and sometimes in a
manner that makes it more likely that the underlying wrong will succeed, go unpunished,
or expand.
170 See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2007).
171 See Business Community’s Compliance with Federal Money Laundering Statutes:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st
Cong. 178–90 (1990) [hereinafter Business Community’s Compliance] (statement of John
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tially, Congress made it a crime to restructure a large cash transaction
into multiple smaller ones with intent to evade the reporting require-
ment.172  At the same time, Congress enacted broad new prohibitions
on money laundering, going beyond reporting requirements to make
the cash transactions themselves illegal.173  Later, Congress and the
courts broadened those new prohibitions in response to concerns
about new circumvention tactics.174  In response to evasion, Congress
C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice)
(describing original purpose of money-laundering statute to restrict criminal activity by
getting at those who financially facilitate such activity); Money Laundering Operations and
the Role of the Department of the Treasury:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 99th Cong. 56–58 (1985) (statement of James Knapp,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (urging passage of
money-laundering legislation so that “emphasis will shift from investigating and prose-
cuting violations of currency reporting and recordkeeping statutes to attacking persons and
institutions who knowingly ‘launder’ the profits of illicit enterprises”); PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION:  ORGANIZED CRIME, FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 8 (1984) (urging legislative broadening of
money-laundering statutes beyond existing reporting requirements because “the degree of
sophistication and complexity in a laundering scheme is virtually infinite, and is limited
only by the creative imagination and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise
such schemes”).
172 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2000)).
173 Id. § 1352, 100 Stat. at 3207-18 to -21 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957 (2000)).
174 See Business Community’s Compliance, supra note 171, at 190–91 (statement of John
C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice), in
which the following concern, among others, is described:
In [one case] we saw the Los Angeles jewelry mart being used as the hub of an
international narcotics conspiracy that laundered more than $1 billion in three
years.  The way the conspiracy operated was as follows:  (1) Drug dealers deliv-
ered cash from cocaine sales to sham jewelry companies in New York City; (2)
To make their businesses look real, the jewelry firms accepted regular ship-
ments of fake gold bars from Latin America; (3) They shipped out boxes of
cash, marked “gold scrap,” to two businesses in the L.A. jewelry district that
were controlled by the cartel; (4) The cash was counted, bundled and then
deposited in L.A. banks, which were told it was from the sale of the supposed
gold; (5) Money from L.A. accounts was transferred to the cartel’s Manhattan
bank accounts, then wired through Panama to South America to pay for coca
and operating expenses; (6) Remaining profits were wired to secret accounts in
European banks or sold through the parallel money exchange market in South
America and returned to the United States where they are used to purchase
luxury goods and services.
See also United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained at Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984, 987–89 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing
sophisticated money-laundering scheme of another international narcotics-trafficking
organization).
The effort to broaden antilaundering laws in response to the pursuit of money laun-
dering continues. See Combating Money Laundering:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Government
Reform, 106th Cong. 13–44 (2000) (statement of Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Att’y
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broadened the drug laws to encompass criminal financial transactions.
Next, the law of criminal financial transactions broadened to encom-
pass more types of economic exchange.
The result is extremely broad law.  And the federal courts have
kept that law broad since its core component was enacted in 1986.175
In the Second Circuit, there are twelve significant decisions construing
the core money-laundering statute in which the court rejected a nar-
rower interpretation in favor of a broader one,176 and only three of
Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (urging passage of bill to expand money-
laundering statutes to reach money-laundering activities beyond United States borders and
explaining how traffickers have shifted laundering efforts abroad because of tightening
prohibitions and bank controls in United States); Money Laundering Crisis:  Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7–21 (2000)
(statements of James K. Robinson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of
Justice, and Stefan D. Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section, Department of Justice) (urging same, for example, by giving detailed description
of new transactional structure known as “Black Market Peso Exchange,” designed to
launder narcotics proceeds beyond reach of United States law).
175 See Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 311, 343–49 (2003) (describing path of judicial construction of money-laundering
statutes).
176 See United States v. Ness, 466 F.3d 79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1956 is
violated when defendant merely transfers proceeds of narcotics sales back up distribution
chain, as long as such transfers are characterized by secrecy), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2900
(2008); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 334–38 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that receipt of
cash “tribute” payments by organized-crime supervisors violates statute when transfers of
such payments are characterized by complexity and secrecy); United States v. Szur, 289
F.3d 200, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “financial transaction” is sufficiently distinct
from “specified unlawful activity” to support separate convictions for laundering and
underlying offense, where proceeds of fraudulent sale of stock are transferred from one
participant in fraud scheme to others); United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236, 240–41 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding that meaning of “financial transaction” allows multiple transactions in
single scheme to be charged as one violation); United States v. McCarthy, 271 F.3d 387,
394–96 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “financial transaction” is sufficiently distinct from
“specified unlawful activity” if defendant embezzles funds by transferring them to account
and then writes checks out of that account); United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 385–87
(2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “proceeds of specified unlawful activity” can include criminal
proceeds generated before adoption of money-laundering statute and transacted after its
adoption); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1525–28 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
defendant involved in transaction designed to conceal source of funds need not have
knowledge of type of criminal activity that generated funds); United States v. Leslie, 103
F.3d 1093, 1101–02 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that handing check to someone in exchange for
cash is “financial transaction,” even if check is never deposited or cashed); United States v.
Kinzler, 55 F.3d 70, 72–74 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that effort to “conceal or disguise” mate-
rial information about “proceeds” need not include effort to disguise identity of owner);
United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319, 326–27 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “financial
transaction” includes physical carrying of cash outside United States); United States v.
Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 677–83 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that “financial transaction” and
“specified unlawful activity” are sufficiently distinct to support separate convictions for
laundering and underlying offense, where participants in bank fraud structure scheme so
that funds are obtained through transfers to overseas accounts); United States v.
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note in which the court rejected a broader interpretation of the statute
in favor of a narrower one.177  The court has been almost uniformly
sympathetic to the view that a broad antilaundering statute is neces-
sary to deal with the many innovative and unforeseeable forms in
which professionals might transact the proceeds of illegal endeavors.
A consequence of this judicial broadening is the opportunity to
sanction actors whose conduct cannot plausibly be described as
involving the kind of strategic efforts to evade sanction that gave rise
to such laws.  Consider the following examples from the Second Cir-
cuit and other courts:  a haberdasher who did a quarter of his business
from sales to a pair of drug dealers;178 a man who used funds pilfered
from his infirm grandmother to buy a pickup truck for his brother and
a house for himself and who made evasive representations to sellers
when asked about his unusual payment methods;179 a worker at a
lawful check-cashing business that processed a large volume of nar-
cotics proceeds who merely cleaned the office and helped count cash
and take it to the bank;180 a tavern proprietor who cashed several
unusually large checks for a patron he knew to be a bookmaker;181
and a woman who arranged and profited from the sale of homes
belonging to relatives she knew to be narcotics traffickers after the
relatives were incarcerated or became fugitives.182
The regulatory scheme is designed for actors who intentionally
position themselves at some remove from direct commission of
harmful acts, but it ends up being amenable to use against actors who
are at such remove not by design but because of lesser culpability or
Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 690–91 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that § 1956’s requirement of
knowledge as to “specified unlawful activity” permits co-conspirators to have differing
beliefs about criminal source of funds).
177 See United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120–22 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that if
narcotics dealer purchases automobile with criminal proceeds in his own name, then there
is no intent “to conceal or disguise” information about criminal proceeds); United States v.
Napoli, 54 F.3d 63, 67–68 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that, where bank fraud involves cashing
bad checks, this “financial transaction” is not sufficiently independent of “specified
unlawful activity” to satisfy § 1956); United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant convicted on basis of engaging in single transaction with
two of statute’s prohibited purposes commits only one money-laundering violation).
178 United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 922–25 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
179 United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1031–36 (10th Cir. 1992).
180 United States v. Frigerio-Migiano, 254 F.3d 30, 31–33 (1st Cir. 2001).  The court of
appeals reversed the conviction in this case on the ground that the jury’s verdict was not
supported by sufficient evidence of the defendant’s knowledge that his actions were part of
a money-laundering operation, not on any question of how marginal the defendant’s role
may have been. See id. at 34–36.
181 United States v. Awada, 425 F.3d 522, 523–25 (8th Cir. 2005).
182 United States v. Cota, 953 F.2d 753, 755–57, 760–61 (2d Cir. 1992).
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dangerousness.183  Or it may simply allow prosecutors to increase
sanctions for actors who are easily punishable for direct commission
of underlying harmful acts.184
A cycle of more than two decades in money-laundering law in
which liability rules have broadened to compete with sophisticated
actors is undeniable, even if it may have finally reached its limits.
There are presently four votes on the Supreme Court to limit the
meaning of criminal “proceeds” in the principal statute to provable
criminal profits,185 which would be a sharp departure from existing
law in the courts of appeals and could severely limit the reach of the
statute as both a doctrinal and practical matter.  Still, one Justice
believes that such a construction of the statute would be appropriate
only for limited types of underlying crimes186 and four Justices reject
such a construction entirely.187  It remains to be seen whether federal
money-laundering prohibitions will become a case of overbreadth
reaching its outer limits and receding.188
C. Obstruction of Legal Process
Federal prohibitions on conduct that obstructs legal process are
extremely broad in both statutes and doctrine.  Statutory prohibitions
on obstruction of federal court and agency proceedings include some-
thing actually called an “omnibus clause.”  This catch-all provision
treats as a felon anyone who “corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or
impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice.”189  Federal courts have described this clause
as “drafted with an eye to ‘the variety of corrupt methods by which
183 Take, for example, a governor of New York who may have tried to conceal his pay-
ments for the services of an illegal interstate prostitution service. See David Johnston &
Stephen Labaton, The Reports That Drew Federal Eyes to Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2008, at B1.
184 See Cue´llar, supra note 175, at 405–18 (discussing data on severity of penalties for
laundering and prosecutors’ focus on predicate offenders).  It must also be noted that the
examination of appellate decisions for arguably unjustified prosecutions for money laun-
dering underreports such cases by omitting prosecutions where the law’s breadth induced
guilty pleas, most of which render the cases untraceable by reported appellate decisions.
185 United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2024–25 (2008) (plurality opinion).
186 Id. at 2031–34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187 Id. at 2035–45 (Alito, J., dissenting).
188 See Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2000–05 (2008) (narrowing, to some
extent, money-laundering statute governing cross-border transportation of funds but
rejecting even narrower interpretation urged by defendant and finding that mental-state
requirement of purpose sufficiently limited reach of statute).
189 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000) (using similar language in
context of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees); United States v.
Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 422–23 (2d Cir. 1991) (construing broadly what counts as “pro-
ceeding” under § 1505).
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the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted, a
variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined,’”190
and as “intended to ensure that criminals could not circumvent the
law’s purpose by devising novel and creative schemes that would
interfere with the administration of justice but would nonetheless fall
outside the scope of [the statute’s] specific prohibitions.”191  In recent
years, Congress has added prohibitions to this framework that reach
acts of obstruction falling outside even these omnibus clauses,
including acts in anticipation of legal proceedings not yet com-
menced192 and destruction of evidence relevant to any form of federal
government inquiry—not just judicial proceedings.193
The judiciary has also been instrumental in broadening obstruc-
tion laws.  Again, consider the Second Circuit.  In many cases, the
court has confronted simple obstructive acts:  doctoring or hiding of
bookkeeping and other records subpoenaed by grand juries;194 bribery
of judges to decide cases;195 intimidation or overt threats of violence
against witnesses if they chose to testify;196 and lying under oath
before tribunals.197  Such core cases continue to arise, of course, and
fall squarely within the scope of the obstruction statutes.  But prosecu-
tors and judges have steadily supplemented this core with cases that
involve behavior altered, or removed one step, from those in the core:
influencing a prosecutor by fraud rather than bribe;198 arranging for a
defendant to have unnecessary surgery to disrupt a criminal trial;199
encouraging a witness, subtly (or not) and for an illegitimate purpose,
to testify falsely or to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to
190 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 206–07 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Anderson v.
United States, 215 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1954)).
191 United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir. 1997).
192 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
193 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. IV 2006).
194 E.g., United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 464 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Siegel,
263 F.2d 530, 532 (2d Cir. 1959); Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1917);
see also United States v. Jespersen, 65 F.3d 993, 998–1001 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that it
can be obstruction to produce falsified document even if production of document was
required by subpoena).
195 E.g., United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 940–41 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 463–64 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834,
840–44 (2d Cir. 1939).
196 E.g., United States v. Bradwell, 388 F.2d 619, 620–21 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Kahn, 366 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Woodmansee, 354 F.2d 235, 235
(2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1941).
197 E.g., United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 149–50 (2d Cir. 1975).
198 United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333, 334–35 (2d Cir. 1941).
199 United States v. Minkoff, 137 F.2d 402, 403–04 (2d Cir. 1943).
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testify;200 lying to a witness in the hope that the witness would believe
the lie and repeat it to a grand jury;201 deliberately testifying in an
evasive manner and falsely asserting lack of recollection;202
attempting to move evidence sought by the police to a location where
it would be harder to find;203 engaging in obstructive acts designed to
disrupt trial without realizing the proceedings they were obstructing
were federal in nature;204 assuming ownership of a fugitive’s real
estate holdings in order to help conceal his whereabouts;205 and
sharing information with grand jury targets about whom the grand
jury is investigating.206  By contrast, the Second Circuit has found very
few occasions to limit the scope of the obstruction statutes.207
200 E.g., United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 128–29, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d
116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 209–10, 215 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1012–14 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Biaggi, 853
F.2d 89, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1060, 1069–70 (2d Cir.
1986), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (1987); United States v. Rodolitz, 786
F.2d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1116–19 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Grunewald, 233
F.2d 556, 570–71 (2d Cir. 1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
201 United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102–05 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
202 E.g., United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 882–84 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 753–54 (2d Cir. 1971).
203 United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1981).
204 United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 359–62 (2d Cir. 1986).
205 United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 442–46 (2d Cir. 1991).
206 United States v. Giovanelli, 464 F.3d 346, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2006).
207 The following are the nine meaningful limiting cases that are reported and citable:
United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 86–89 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing convictions because
prosecution did not satisfy element requiring defendant to have known and intended that
false statements in interview would reach grand jury); United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 86,
91–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that, for witness-tampering statute to apply, possibility of
federal inquiry must be supported by facts and not mere hypothesis), vacated for reconsid-
eration on other grounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005); United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76,
102–03, 107–10 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing convictions of New York City police officers in
infamous brutality case involving victim Abner Louima because prosecution did not satisfy
element requiring defendants to have known and intended that false statements in inter-
views would reach grand jury); United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 762–63 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that witness-tampering statute, not “omnibus” clause of general obstruction
statute, must be used to prosecute interference with witnesses prior to initiation of judicial
proceedings); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 236–38 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
witness-tampering statute, as distinct from “omnibus” clause of general obstruction statute,
does not cover noncoercive effort to persuade witness to lie), superseded by statute, Minor
and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000 & Supp.
IV 2006); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1236 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that it is not
obstruction of justice to produce false document that was covered by subpoena and was
not falsified in course of responding to subpoena when evidence is insufficient to establish
intent); United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that relationship
between obstructive act and potential future legal proceeding cannot be too remote, as
violator must have particular federal proceeding in mind); United States v. Bufalino, 285
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Notice that each of these cases beyond the core involves a
behavior that responds to some basic legal rule:  A grand jury witness
is lied to, rather than told to lie, because perjury prohibitions might
deter the witness from purposely lying; evidence is moved to a more
remote location because simply destroying the evidence is more likely
to lead to punishment; testimony is evasive and forgetful because
direct lies are more likely to be punished; and so on.
Another key move by courts to facilitate the broadening of
obstruction laws has been the interpretation of “corruptly”—the mens
rea element found in the principal obstruction statutes—to mean
“with an improper purpose to obstruct justice.”208  This somewhat
question-begging mens rea formulation has meant that the answer to
the question of what behavior counts as criminal obstruction of justice
is, in essence, “Anything that is intended to obstruct justice.”209
While, as I will discuss in Part III, mens rea requirements can in some
situations narrow prohibitions that otherwise apply to many forms of
conduct,210 in this context a mens rea formulation has been used to
state that there shall be no ex ante limit on the forms that impermis-
sibly obstructive behavior can take.
The furthest reach of this broadening trend in obstruction law
thus far has been the punishment of lawyers and others who engage in
litigation conduct that is deemed out of bounds:  a criminal defense
attorney who met with a mob boss to plan how to steer clients, who
were mob underlings, toward refusing to testify in a grand jury (to the
point of one client’s imprisonment for contempt);211 a civil lawyer
who, while invested in business with a client who was the target of a
criminal racketeering case, attempted to derail the criminal inquiry by
bringing frivolous lawsuits in state court against federal law-
F.2d 408, 414–16 (2d Cir. 1960) (finding evidence insufficient to establish conspiracy to
obstruct justice in case of large group of attendees lying about purpose of infamous gath-
ering on November 14, 1957, of many reputed mobsters at farm in Apalachin, New York);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006) (providing for affirmative defense to
witness tampering if defendant’s sole purpose was “to encourage, induce, or cause the
other person to testify truthfully”).
208 See Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1917) (“[A]ny endeavor to
impede and obstruct the due administration of justice . . . is corrupt.”).  The Second Circuit
has held that this mens rea formulation saves the statutes from the charge that they are
unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996).
209 Julie O’Sullivan argues that at least some of the federal decisions have gone further,
implying that engaging in any behavior intentionally, while foreseeing that the act would
have obstructive consequences, satisfies the statutes’ mens rea requirements.  O’Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 688–89 & n.185.
210 See infra Part III.A.
211 United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 983–96 (1st Cir. 1987).
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1545
enforcement officials;212 and an investment banker who sent an email
telling colleagues to attend to neglected document clean-up after he
was told of a related grand jury investigation in which he might be in
jeopardy.213
When the problem is how to draw a line between unwanted inter-
ference with legal processes and legitimate, or even welcome, adver-
sarial behavior, there is notable circularity in defining the mens rea for
obstruction of justice as a “purpose to obstruct justice.”214  After all,
litigating is a way to avoid sanctioning, and litigating is not only
socially welcome but also a protected right.215  This tension might
explain why the Supreme Court has struggled recently with the mens
rea requirements for obstruction offenses, ruling that a federal judge
who lied at his home to FBI agents did not obstruct justice because he
neither knew nor intended that his false statements would be supplied
to a grand jury216 and that a public-company auditor that rushed to
shred documents with knowledge of their relevance to an impending
SEC inquiry could not be convicted unless its employees were proven
to have destroyed the evidence with “consciousness of
wrongdoing.”217
Even with some recent limiting moves, the overbreadth in
obstruction of justice law is plain.  In attempting to keep the law
limber in the face of creative and determined efforts to derail the
sanctioning process, legislators, prosecutors, and judges have created a
legal scheme that, in its worst light, can be charged with maintaining
that one person’s aggressive litigation is another person’s criminal
obstruction of justice.218
212 United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 624–35 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1274–75, 1289–95 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming conviction of
attorney-promoter in stock-offering scheme for obstructing SEC investigation by coaching
witnesses to withhold facts from SEC, in part to shield attorney’s son from liability).
213 United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2006).  The court reversed
Quattrone’s conviction because the trial judge misstated the law in his instructions to the
jury. Id. at 177–81.  The court nonetheless explained at length that the evidence was suffi-
cient to establish that Quattrone criminally obstructed justice when he sent his email. Id.
at 171–76.
214 Another problem is that the federal obstruction statutes contain plain old bad
drafting:  They are too often sloppy, redundant, and confusing.  O’Sullivan, supra note 16,
at 679–85.
215 At least, it is protected most of the time. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII (guaran-
teeing right to jury trial in criminal and most civil cases).
216 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 595–97, 600–01 (1995).
217 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698–701, 704–06 (2005).
218 The point is starkly presented by Congress’s most recent intervention in obstruction
law, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. V 2006)—a component of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation—
which makes a felon of anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the
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D. Loopholing and Fraud
Expansive pressure on liability rules is greatest when evasive
actors are most determined and sophisticated.219  A highly self-aware
relationship between behavior and regulation often fits this pattern.
Suppose my law school’s policy states that I may distribute professor-
evaluation forms to students at any time during the last two weeks of
the semester.  The policy’s purpose is to increase response rates by
affording instructors and students flexibility.  I decide to distribute the
evaluations on the first eligible day while intentionally saving the most
mystifying and boring twenty percent of the material for the last two
weeks of classes, during which I engage in a force-feeding exercise.
Having observed me do this, my law school changes the rule the
following semester.  Now, evaluations may be conducted at any time
during the final two weeks of classes, but no date may be selected “for
the purpose of preventing the students from fairly evaluating the
instructor on the basis of any significant portion of the course or for
any other purpose designed to produce misleading results.”  I again
distribute the evaluations on the first eligible day and then cover the
least tolerable twenty percent of the material during the last two
weeks.
Have I violated the new regime?  I have complied with its bright-
line, conduct-based rule by distributing the evaluations at “any time
during the last two weeks.”  Whether I have violated the intent-based
standard that fortifies the conduct rule depends on what I was
thinking, which is not directly observable.  In the twenty percent case,
especially in light of my conduct in the prior semester, the inference
that I harbored the prohibited intent is strong.  But what about harder
cases involving, for example, coverage of fifteen percent of the bad
material in the last two weeks, or ten percent of it—or an instructor
with no history of circumvention?
This pattern appears in many areas of law, particularly where the
law attempts to identify a subset of harmful behaviors in a class that
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.”  The
statute has been broadly applied to arguably impulsive, fleeting, or trivial acts by minor
actors. See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 196–98 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
statute was violated when woman threw calendar in trash while being led away from her
desk for interview with investigators pursuing case of government contracting fraud);
United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752, 753–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming conviction of
woman who broke CD in half that contained child pornography at instruction of boyfriend
who had learned he was under investigation for possession of such materials).  Some con-
sequences of overbroad obstruction laws easing the pursuit of “pretextual prosecutions”
are explored in Richman & Stuntz, supra note 78.
219 See Kahan, supra note 69, at 493–94 (describing problem of “loopholing”).
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1547
includes socially desirable ones.220  A rule proves too easy to circum-
vent in a manner that produces the very harm the rule was meant to
prevent.  Altering the content of the rule only produces different
forms of harmful circumvention.  In response, the legal system adopts
a standard saying something like “Do not produce the harm with
which this regime is concerned.”  Such a broad standard raises con-
cerns about notice and control of discretion in enforcement as well as
overdeterrence and sanctioning of nonblameworthy persons.  The
standard is thus made to turn on something about the actor’s mental
state in an effort to give it precision and predictability.221  Because
220 For example, the SEC frequently appends the following language to regulations
defining safe harbors from general prohibitions that regulate the socially valuable process
of capital formation:  “This [safe harbor] is not available for any communication that,
although in technical compliance with this section, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the
requirements of [the Securities Act of 1933].”  17 C.F.R. § 230.168 preliminary note 1
(2007); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription To Retire the Rhetoric of ‘Princi-
ples-Based Systems’ in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1411, 1430–33 (2007) (exploring how various regulatory systems combine use of rules
and principles).  The tax laws—the paradigmatic rule-based form of regulation—include
principles, like the “form over substance” and “step transaction” doctrines, that authorize
courts to impose liability ex post if an actor has structured conduct ex ante that complies in
literal terms with the code but accomplishes ends equivalent to those barred by, and moti-
vating, the rules.  See Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code:
Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 882 (2007) (“[T]ax shelters are
generally characterized as transactions that appear to comply in a literal manner with the
Code, but which are designed to reach a tax result that Congress would not have
intended.”); see also Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1205–07 (2008) (describing problem of taxpayers using non-
binding “relational” agreements as means of avoiding tax consequences of contractual
arrangements); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 871
(1999) (“[Rules are] an easy target for tax planning . . . .  To reduce this potential, rules
must become more complex, and greater complexity creates additional opportunities for
planning, and onward and onward.  Standards are fuzzy at the borders, reducing this
problem.”).
221 The focus on mental state may also further an agenda of sanctioning only those who
deserve to be sanctioned. See Buell, supra note 91, at 2022–36 (exploring how fraud law’s
focus on actor’s “consciousness of wrongdoing” sorts commercial actors engaging in decep-
tion according to relative blameworthiness); cf. Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax
Code?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1997) (reviewing LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS:
EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996)) (arguing that
nature and extent of actor’s purpose in engaging in harmful behavior is central to assess-
ment of moral blameworthiness).  I have borrowed the “loopholing” term and concept
from Kahan, supra note 30, at 137–40.  I may depart from Kahan where mens rea is con-
cerned.  Kahan argues that courts have to distinguish unwanted loopholing from permis-
sible efforts to structure behavior around sanctioning regimes by deciding whether the
actor was virtuous according to prevailing moral standards. Id. at 140–42.  I am not per-
suaded that more conventional inquiry into mental state cannot identify blameworthy
loopholers in many contexts, nor am I persuaded that having judges guesstimate prevailing
moral standards can eliminate the problem of overbreadth in standards that are designed
to prevent actors from engineering around rule-based regimes.  For further discussion of
how reference to mental states can refine overbroad liability rules, see infra Part III.A.
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mental state is not observable, and conclusions about it must be based
on inferences from observable conduct, the fit between the legal
regime and the problem it addresses might remain less than
optimal.222
A standard in the form of “Do not engage in behavior X with the
intent to produce undesirable harm (or acquire unjustified gain) Y,”
permits sanctioning of some persons whose conduct does not substan-
tially threaten the interests the legal regime is designed to protect.223
Without such a standard, however, a rule-based regime is doomed to
fail in its effort to sanction those who do seriously threaten those
interests, because such persons will reorganize their conduct to
achieve their desired criminal ends without transgressing the terms of
the applicable rules.224
The criminal law of fraud follows this pattern.  Frauds are means
of appropriating property and similar interests of others without vio-
lating the basic prohibition on theft.  This very concept posits an actor
who is resourceful, clever, and cognizant of legal and normative con-
straints.225  Legal prohibitions on fraud are exceedingly open textured,
222 Another way to conceptualize this phenomenon is to say that a regulatory system
chooses to shift from adjudicating conduct ex ante (the effect of rules) to adjudicating it ex
post (the effect of standards).  Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Anal-
ysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992).  Kaplow conceives of the choice between rules and
standards as largely about efficiency:  Rules are more costly to produce but are more effi-
cient when the regulatory problem is likely to involve conduct that arises frequently and in
similar form. Id. at 579–81.  Kaplow recognizes, but does not discuss, the relationship
between efforts to avoid sanctioning and the legal system’s choice between rules and stan-
dards. See id. at 618 (“[B]ecause laws of form are often designed to prevent fraud, which
may be easier to commit if there are known rigid rules that a fraudulent actor can carefully
circumvent, standards may be preferable in some contexts.”); see also Cunningham, supra
note 220, at 1423 (“[R]ules can be blueprints for evading their underlying purposes.  Bright
lines and exceptions to exceptions facilitate strategic evasion, allowing artful dodging of
the rule’s spirit by literal compliance with its technical letter.”).
223 This problem may be particularly acute in the tax context, given society’s normative
ambivalence about loopholing to avoid taxes. See Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Pur-
pose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485, 515 (1967) (“It clearly would be
foolish to attempt to define tax avoidance as merely a more intense or pervasive version of
tax minimization.”). This might explain the Supreme Court’s ruling that a tax protester,
who had listened to an argument made at seminars that ordinary wages were not “income”
within the meaning of the tax code and subsequently refused to pay taxes on his wages, was
entitled to a jury instruction at his criminal trial for tax evasion that the government had to
prove that he knew his conduct was unlawful (i.e., that ignorance of the law is a defense to
tax evasion).  Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 195–96, 201–03 (1991).
224 A recent critical treatment of breadth in criminal and regulatory law is Skeel &
Stuntz, supra note 116.  Skeel and Stuntz argue that rule-based regulation, “[r]ather than
cultivating a sense of moral responsibility . . . simply function[s] as an obstacle course, a set
of barriers around which corporate officers must maneuver.” Id. at 836.  Of course, the
legal system often resorts to broad standards as a response to the problem that Skeel and
Stuntz describe.
225 Buell, supra note 91, at 1972–75.
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often consisting in statutory form of no more than the edict “Do not
defraud others.”226  In Anglo-American legal systems, legislators and
courts have been keen to defend the open texture in fraud laws
against those who have criticized it as violating the legality prin-
ciple.227  In mounting that defense, legal actors have often said that
open texture in fraud law is essential to combat the incessant efforts of
the inventive “fraud artist” to craft novel means of appropriating
others’ interests and to circumvent definitions and conceptions of
those who make the criminal code.228
The federal mail fraud statute, enacted in 1889, might have been
interpreted as a measure exclusively for punishing those who prey
upon victims with mail-based scams.229  Early in the statute’s history,
however, the Supreme Court rejected this limited reading and sent the
statute off on a broadening course.230  The Court’s only significant
effort to limit the statute’s scope—a 1987 ruling that rejected the idea
226 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (making it criminal to “devise any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud” and to use mails in furtherance of such scheme or artifice (emphasis
added)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (prohibiting “any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud” and “any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud” in “connection with
the purchase or sale” of securities (emphasis added)).
227 Some of this history is described in Buell, supra note 91, at 1987–2014.
228 See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–07 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (“The criminal mail fraud statute must remain strong . . . to cope with the new
varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive American ‘con artist’ is sure to develop.”); Weiss
v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941) (“The law does not define fraud; it needs
no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity.”); McAleer v.
Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 452 (1872) (“[A]s it is the very nature and essence of fraud to elude all
laws in fact, without appearing to break them in form, a technical definition of fraud . . .
would be in effect telling to the crafty precisely how to avoid the grasp of the law.”); Letter
from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames (June 30, 1759), in JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 501, 508 (1828) (“Fraud is infinite, and were a court of Equity
. . . to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction would be . . . perpetually
eluded by new schemes, which the fertility of man’s invention would contrive.”).  The
development of the substantive law of fraud has been highly expansive at least since 1601
when Lord Coke, reporting a case as the Queen’s Attorney General and pressing for a
broad interpretation of an Elizabethan statute targeting fraudulent conveyances, stated:
“[B]ecause fraud and deceit abound in these days more than in former times, it was
resolved in this case by the whole Court, that all statutes made against fraud should be
liberally and beneficially expounded to suppress fraud.”  Twyne’s Case, (1601) 76 Eng.
Rep. 809, 815–16 (K.B.).  In his report, Coke also said:  “Quoeritur, ut crescent tot magna
volumina legis?  In promptu causa est, crescit in orbe dolus.” Id. at 815.  The phrase trans-
lates as:  “If you ask why are there so many laws, the answer is that fraud ever increases on
this earth.” CHARLES ROSS, ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE AND THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE 105 (2003).
229 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 723 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is
mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs liability.”).
230 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (“[The mail fraud statute]
includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or
suggestions and promises as to the future.  The significant fact is the intent and purpose.”).
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that a fraud can consist of an effort to deprive a person of her “intan-
gible right” to honest services of the defendant231—was quickly
reversed by Congress.232  The breadth of the federal mail fraud statute
is sufficient to have spawned its own literature within the work on
overcriminalization.233
The development of the law of securities fraud has been similar.
When it passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and empowered
the Securities and Exchange Commission to make antifraud rules,234
the New Deal Congress had broader remedial objectives than the
nineteenth-century Congress that enacted the mail fraud statute.
Judicial doctrine has extended the law further, as the federal courts
have bypassed opportunities to narrow the scope of behaviors in the
securities markets treated as fraud and—most famously with the
development of the insider-trading doctrine—have created new theo-
ries of securities fraud.235
Consider the example of accounting fraud, the deceptive use of
the conventions that shape how publicly traded firms report their
financial performance to investors and markets.236  The typical motive
for accounting fraud is compensation benefits, including equity, that
flow to managers of firms when stock prices rise in response to market
231 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356–60 (1987).
232 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)) (reversing result in McNally).
233 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud:  The Continuing Story of
the “Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983) (suggesting “core
premises” upon which mail fraud statute should be reformed); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern
Mail Fraud:  The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427
(1998) (developing and arguing for limiting principles to restrict reach of § 1346);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:  Someone To Watch
Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1994) (arguing that mail fraud statute’s incorporation
of intangible-rights doctrine raises constitutional concerns, including vagueness, and pro-
posing alternative legislation).
234 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (known as “section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act”); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2007) (known as “Rule 10b-5”).
235 For cases developing insider-trading liability—a doctrine that neither § 10(b) of the
‘34 Act nor Rule 10b-5 explicitly create—see, for example, United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642 (1997), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), and Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
(“When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”).  The one significant area of nar-
rowing has been the scope of persons who may be held liable for fraudulent behavior in a
private lawsuit. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (declining to extend 10b-5 private right of action to reach third-party defendants
who enter into supply contracts with public companies alleged to have committed
accounting fraud); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
177–78 (1994) (rejecting aiding-and-abetting liability under § 10(b)).
236 See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 593–605 (3d ed. 2007)
(summarizing various methods of accounting fraud).
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perception of firms’ strong financial performance.  The usual means of
accounting fraud are methods to boost companies’ stock prices
through the reporting of rosy financial data when a firm’s true eco-
nomic fundamentals do not support a rising stock price.  With
accounting fraud, prohibitions on securities fraud interact with
detailed industry conventions on reporting financial performance,
principally contained in the quasi-code known as Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP).  This regulatory scheme presents
opportunities for evasion, particularly if the accounting treatment of
an item under GAAP turns on matters having to do with a manager’s
reliance on the advice of professionals and experts that the manager
compensates.237
Fraud prosecutions for accounting manipulations sometimes raise
the question of whether technical compliance with the arcane and
often counterintuitive rules of GAAP, even if such “compliance” is
engineered to mislead the consumer of a firm’s financial reports, sup-
plies a defense.  One can understand the argument that it would.  If
standard-setters have required industry participants to abide by rule-
based conventions, then industry participants ought to know they can
sleep soundly as long as a technician has opined that their public fil-
ings fit the letter of those rules.  The courts, it turns out, have not been
persuaded by this argument.238  In an opinion by Judge Henry
Friendly in 1969, the Second Circuit ruled that, while compliance with
GAAP conventions is evidentiary as to state of mind in a fraud prose-
cution, it does not supply a defense that would give rise, for example,
to a dismissal or a jury instruction requiring acquittal based on such a
finding.239  A manager commits fraud, the court held, if she misleads
with the intent to defraud—GAAP compliance or no GAAP compli-
ance.240  The Second Circuit reaffirmed this rule in the recent prosecu-
237 See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, SEC v. Meridian Holdings, Inc., No. CV07-06335-DDP
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp
20318.pdf   (charging firm with securities fraud for more than doubling its stock price in
short period by reporting large default judgment and interest on judgment as assets and
income, though managers had no reasonable basis to believe judgment was collectible); see
also BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:  THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (providing detailed account for
lay reader of accounting maneuvers within Enron); John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and
Securities Reform:  An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 69–82
(2005) (describing some technical aspects of Enron accounting fraud).
238 For an illuminating discussion of the problems that follow from formalist accounts of
obligations in such areas as financial reporting and tax compliance, see William H. Simon,
After Confidentiality:  Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1455–64 (2006). For a defense of the morality in formalism,
see generally KATZ, supra note 221.
239 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805–06 (2d Cir. 1969).
240 Id. at 806–07.
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tions of Bernard Ebbers, former chief executive officer of
WorldCom,241 and former executives of Adelphia Corporation.242
The Second Circuit has charted similar expansive courses in other
areas of fraud law.  The most controversial area of federal fraud law is
the prohibition in the mail and wire fraud statutes on devising a
scheme to defraud a person of her “intangible right of honest ser-
vices” from the defendant.243  In a recent en banc ruling on this
statute, the court reversed a panel ruling in another case that held this
portion of the statute to be unconstitutionally vague,244 reaffirming
the statute’s validity and giving it a judicially crafted and very broad
gloss.245  The court also has acted expansively in applying the mail
fraud statute in public-corruption contexts.  In one oft-cited case, the
court held that a political-party boss with no government position
could be prosecuted for depriving citizens of their “intangible right to
honest services” of government officials because the boss (who was
alleged to have taken bribes in exchange for patronage jobs) exercised
de facto control over government functions.246  And the court has held
241 United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2006).
242 United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2007).
243 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
244 United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2002), overruled by United States
v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
245 See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144 (finding defendant’s conduct in Handakas “not within
the scope of behavior proscribed by section 1346” and overruling “unnecessary constitu-
tional ruling”).  The Second Circuit held:
[The statute prohibits] a scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable
an officer or employee of a private entity (or a person in a relationship that
gives rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to
employers) purporting to act for and in the interests of his or her employer (or
of the other person to whom the duty of loyalty is owed) secretly to act in his
or her or the defendant’s own interests instead, accompanied by a material
misrepresentation made or omission of information disclosed to the employer
or other person.
Id. at 146–47.
246 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121–26 (2d Cir. 1982). But see United
States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting theory of Margiotta that
nonpublic officials can owe duty of honest services to citizens absent state-law violation).
The Second Circuit’s attitude toward the mail fraud statute is shared by most, but not all,
of the other circuits.  For example, a recent Fifth Circuit ruling held that bankers who aided
former executives of Enron in accounting fraud could not be charged for assisting the exec-
utives in depriving Enron shareholders of their right to honest services because, the court
said, Enron led those executives to believe the company wanted them to inflate earnings.
United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2006).  The ruling is anomalous,
even when measured against that circuit’s own prior decisions. See United States v.
Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733–34 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that breach of any duty specified
under state law can give rise to charge of “honest services” fraud).  Even in Brown, the
court implied that there would have been little difficulty with a fraud theory had the gov-
ernment charged on a conventional theory of securities fraud rather than on a theory of
“honest services” mail fraud.  459 F.3d at 522–23.
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that a public-company officer can violate the statute by engaging in
self-dealing, on the theory that an officer defrauds shareholders of
their “right to control” corporate assets if she conceals in public filings
the true nature of payments by the corporation.247
The conclusions are unmistakable:  Federal fraud law is very
broad, and its breadth is driven in part by an agenda of maintaining
supple legal tools to deal with inventive and resourceful persons
determined to appropriate the interests of others.  Fraud law is also
overbroad.  The federal reporters contain plenty of examples of fraud
sanctions against persons who cannot plausibly be described as the
kinds of inventive, resourceful, and threatening actors who compel the
legal system to maintain flexible instruments of defense.  It is hard to
see much to worry about—at least for purposes of federal punish-
ment—in professors who award doctorates to students they know to
have engaged in plagiarism in the hope that the students, once placed
in government jobs, will steer grants to the professors,248 or in college
coaches who falsify students’ academic records in order to help them
maintain eligibility to play basketball under NCAA rules.249  Yet these
sorts of persons commonly lose in federal court.  One reason that they
lose is that judges deciding their cases believe that interpreting the
statute narrowly enough to support a ruling that “this defendant’s
conduct was not fraud” will give the statute a meaning that helps
resourceful actors elude its grasp.250
III
OVERBREADTH AND AGENCY COSTS
What is to be done about all this overbreadth in criminal law (or
at least the portion that is not due to sloppy lawmaking)?  How should
247 United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461–64 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that, under some conditions,
mail fraud charge can be based on fiduciary’s concealment of conflict of interest from ben-
eficiary). But see United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Mail fraud
cannot be charged against a corporate agent who in good faith believes that his or her
(otherwise legal) misleading or inaccurate conduct is in the corporation’s best interests.”).
248 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1997).
249 United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 771–72 (5th Cir. 1996).
250 Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, while underestimating the difficulty of the problem,
stated the point in a recent opinion in a mail fraud case:
This prosecution, which led to the conviction and imprisonment of a civil ser-
vant for conduct that, as far as this record shows, was designed to pursue the
public interest as the employee understood it, may well induce Congress to
take another look at the wisdom of enacting ambulatory criminal prohibitions.
Haziness designed to avoid loopholes through which bad persons can wriggle
can impose high costs on people the statute was not designed to catch.
United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
1554 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1491
social planners respond to the unjustified criminalization that follows
from the widening of liability rules for justified purposes?  One
response would be to try to eradicate overbreadth, either through
aggressive campaigns of statutory reform or judicial efforts to curtail
statutes through more robust constitutional limitations on substantive
criminal law.  As advocates of these approaches recognize, their pros-
pects are dim.251  Most scholars believe the outlook is bleak because
the political economy of criminal law supplies little currency to
anyone who wants to narrow liability rules.252  True enough.  But
maybe it would be a bad idea to do away with overbreadth, or at least
one form of it, by quitting the chase of the most elusive wrongdoers.
Overbreadth, when it results from regulatory efforts that can only
reach undesirable behaviors with liability rules that overshoot their
mark, is not itself a problem.  The problem is the agency costs
imposed on society by the undesirable actions of enforcers empow-
ered by overbroad rules.  Suppose rule X, which is intended to sanc-
tion harmful behavior A, turns out, on its terms, also to authorize
sanctioning of much less (or non-) harmful behavior B.  The problem
is of largely academic interest unless one or more of three things hap-
pens:  An enforcer uses rule X to sanction behavior B; an enforcer
induces a guilty plea to some offense that could not have been
obtained but by threatening to use rule X to sanction behavior B; or
behavior B is not only not harmful but also socially valuable, and a
private actor refrains from behavior B out of fear that an enforcer will
use rule X to sanction behavior B.
When enforcers use open-textured statutes to address new behav-
iors, and courts interpret such statutes to facilitate these efforts, crim-
inal law develops outside of the legislative process.  Resulting agency
costs can include not only those of self-aggrandizement but also those
of prosecutors choosing cases and of judges interpreting statutes on
the basis of erroneous behavioral norms.  It may be somewhat in the
eye of the beholder whether a case is an instance of a strategic actor
seeking to avoid sanction along the boundaries of the law or one of a
nonblameworthy actor engaged in a socially welcome activity.  Open
251 See Smith, supra note 16, at 930–51; Stuntz, supra note 16, at 587–98, 600.
252 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that while efforts to increase legisla-
tive and public oversight over prosecutors “sound promising on paper, they cannot serve as
a realistic check in today’s political climate”); see also supra text accompanying notes
20–22.
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texture may also permit criminal prohibitions to be used as vehicles to
advance particular, and perhaps nonmajoritarian, agendas.253
Of course, if nothing will be lost in the process, narrowing rule X
so it does not cover behavior B is probably the easiest and cheapest
way to avoid having to worry about the risk that enforcers will act this
way.  But if there is something to be lost from narrowing the rule, the
first resort in grappling with the problem of potential agency costs
should be to consider measures to control those costs without having
to abandon the existing liability rule.  Whether there is something sub-
stantial to be lost is, of course, a tough empirical question.  The
answer will vary by context and will require consideration of many
things, such as the relative harm produced by behavior A in relation
to the total lost social value, if any, from people who refrain from
behavior B out of fear of being sanctioned under rule X.
My claim about desirable overbreadth in liability rules is thus an
additional and somewhat different voice in a chorus that is urging
greater attention—as a matter of empirics, theory, and reform—to
understanding and controlling prosecutorial discretion.254  To manage
agency costs successfully, social planners need to know much more
empirically about how prosecutors behave and need to think harder
about how that behavior is affected by institutional design and legal
regimes.  For the time being, I will mention three possible avenues for
control that follow from the account I have supplied of overbreadth in
liability rules:  adapting liability rules through mens rea limitations,
managing key institutional actors such as prosecutors, and leveraging
judicial sentencing discretion.
A. Adapting Liability Rules
I have suggested that narrowing statutes may not be the best
response to overbreadth if such narrowing would make statutes inef-
fective with respect to the undesirable behaviors that those statutes
target.  Of course, this claim has its limits.  As measured solely by its
ability to reach behaviors, the “most effective” statute will be one that
commits to almost nothing ex ante and delegates all important ques-
tions about its application to legal actors ex post.255  Such a polar case
253 See Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1039, 1046–57 (2008) (examining how legal actors and others can shape content of criminal
law outside lawmaking process).
254 For current examples of contemporary scholarship that is seeking to better theorize
prosecutorial power, see Barkow, supra note 3, Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The
Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=111
4172, Richman, supra note 38, and Richman, supra note 71.
255 The law of National Socialist Germany included the following chilling statute:
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is as easy to reject as a legal regime that prohibits punishment unless a
person’s specific behavior has been described ex ante in a detailed
legal rule actually known to that person (thus, ignorance of the law is
generally not a defense and constitutional enforcement of legality-
related doctrines is modest).
To identify the optimal point between the poles requires solving
one of the most fundamental problems for a legal system:  defining the
proper normative criteria for evaluating a trade between generality
and specificity in legal rules.  How do we determine, at the margin,
how to trade freedom reduction and risk of erroneous punishment of
innocents against permitting social harms to go unanswered?  To
return to the pit bull example discussed in Part I, a blanket ban on
“ownership of a vicious dog” may guarantee that all bloodthirsty pit
bull hobbyists can be punished.  But it is likely to punish some people
who were not trying to own vicious dogs, and it may cause some
animal lovers to eschew dog ownership to avoid the risk of punish-
ment.256  Yet a narrow rule that bans only ownership of dogs of a spe-
cific breed is sure to permit some vicious dogs to run amok, producing
injuries and deaths.
Not surprisingly, I am not prepared to offer a crisp normative
formula for trading at the margin between these two states of affairs.
I can state, however, that some kinds of narrowing in liability rules are
likely to be more successful than others in accommodating competing
objectives.  In instances in which overbreadth results from an effort to
avoid excluding harmful behaviors from the scope of a rule, con-
stricting the elements of actus reus, result, or attendant circumstance
Whoever commits an action which the law declares to be punishable or which
is deserving of punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law
and the sound perception of the people, shall be punished.  If no determinate
penal law is directly applicable to the action, it shall be punished according to
the law, the basic idea of which fits it best.
Lawrence Preuss, Punishment by Analogy in National Socialist Penal Law, 26 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 847, 847 (1935–1936) (quoting Gesetz zur A¨nderung des
Strafgesetzbuchs, June 28, 1935, RGBl. I at 839, art. 1); cf. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 49 (1968) (arguing for importance of “excusing conditions” because
only “choosing being” deserves punishment).
256 See Mitchell N. Berman, On the Moral Structure of White-Collar Crime, 5 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 301, 326–27 (2007) (explaining that contours of criminal offense may depart
from contours of underlying moral wrong it is designed to punish due to prudential needs
of criminal justice system).  It should be noted that overbreadth has consequences only if
rules have the constitutive feature that Frederick Schauer calls entrenchment; that is, their
general propositions do not give way when confronted with particulars that do not fit with
their underlying justifications. SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 49.  This is true of criminal
liability rules.
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in liability rules is likely to be costly.257  Narrowing these elements
facilitates evasion in that it requires more precommitment by the legal
system and makes easier targets for persons acting in the shadow of
the law.258
For example, suppose one tried to narrow obstruction of justice
prohibitions to eliminate less significant cases by requiring the prose-
cutor to prove not just that the defendant’s act could have affected the
outcome of a legal proceeding but that it actually did affect the out-
come—in other words, making materiality an empirical, rather than
theoretical, question for the factfinder.  Many serious cases of obstruc-
tion would go unpunished because counterfactuals are hard to prove,
especially beyond a reasonable doubt.  “Even if I sent a chilling mes-
sage to that witness who clammed up in the grand jury,” a defendant
might argue, “who is to say she would not have become tight-lipped
anyway?”  “And next time,” he might think, “I will threaten just the
witnesses who have criminal exposure of their own, since as to all of
them I will have the argument that they were likely to have invoked
their right to silence in any event.”
This problem is not as acute with mens rea elements.  As the
Supreme Court explains when discussing vagueness doctrine, insisting
that actors may be sanctioned only if found to have harbored partic-
ular mental states reduces the risk of broad liability rules being
deployed in the absence of sufficient notice and blameworthiness.259
The use of mental state as a limiting principle is an underbreadth set-
off against overbreadth:  Broad conduct rules may sweep too many
actors into the sanctioning process, but mens rea requirements may
sweep in too few because mental states are difficult to discover and
prove and because some people do serious social harms yet act
without fully culpable mental states.
Mens rea inquiry is a natural response to the problem of
preventing broadly framed conduct rules from violating legality-
related commitments by surprising unaware or blameless persons with
sanctions.260  The more purposeful an individual’s pursuit of a harmful
257 For a basic discussion of act, result, and attendant-circumstance elements in criminal
law, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 10–12, 302–10, 324–25 (4th ed. 2003).
258 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2036–39 (arguing that more vague rules of substantive
criminal liability can produce fairer results in criminal enforcement because less precom-
mitment in legal rules affords local actors, especially juries, more leeway to exercise leni-
ency when facts of cases warrant it).
259 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (observing that facial-
vagueness challenge to criminal law is much more viable if law has no mens rea
requirement).
260 Note, however, that in some instances, overbreadth results from the expansion of a
mens rea element. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.
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behavior, the less troubled one ought to be about her claim that she
was surprised by the later intervention of the legal process.261
The broader a rule is (as measured by the range of conduct to
which it applies), the stricter its mens rea requirement (as measured
by the depth of inquiry into an actor’s cognition at the time of her
conduct) should be.262  This relationship is observable in the law of
fraud.  When broad antifraud rules are applied to forms of conduct
that the law has not previously determined to be fraudulent, mental-
state inquiry tends to travel beyond the relatively thin concepts of
knowledge and intent to considerations such as whether the actor pur-
sued the behavior with an understanding that it violated relevant legal
and commercial norms.263
The concept of good faith, at least in some areas of the law, is also
used to sort actors engaged in a broad category of potentially prohib-
ited conduct.  For example, suppose a financier wants to avoid legal
liability in a deal that, as initially conceived, would have imposed such
liability.  She restructures the deal after obtaining a lawyer’s opinion
that the new structure eliminates the potential liability because it
changes something economically substantive and material, not just
formal, about the deal.  This may be appropriate, and lead to no lia-
bility, if the financier genuinely solicited the opinion in an honest
effort to comply with the applicable legal regime.  But it may be
unsuccessful, and incur liability, if the financier manipulated the pro-
cess to guarantee that she would obtain the desired opinion, such as
by selectively disclosing facts to the lawyer.264  The deal structure is
the same in both instances, but the mens rea is different.
By narrowing the offense through a mens rea requirement, the
law has sorted the cases, arguably with the desirable result, without
having had to commit, for purposes of this case or the next one, to
whether the scope of the liability rule is limited to one or more partic-
261 This is why the principle that “pure legal impossibility” is a defense in criminal law
must have to do with controlling enforcement discretion rather than guaranteeing fair
notice:  A person who thought she was breaking the law but was not can hardly claim lack
of notice. Buell, supra note 91, at 2027–28.
262 Darryl Brown has argued that federal courts have already been doing this—con-
straining criminal law’s expansion with enhanced mens rea requirements—at least in areas
in which less harmful behaviors have been criminalized.  Brown, supra note 18, at 262–64.
263 Buell, supra note 91, at 1996–2014.
264 See United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
reliance on advice of counsel, if it establishes “good faith,” can negate element of specific
intent in criminal fraud charge); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–22 (1984)
(holding that exclusionary rule does not apply if officers executing faulty warrant believe in
“good faith” that warrant is legally valid); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 63–67 (Del. 2006) (exploring forms of management conduct that constitute “bad
faith” under Delaware law).
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ular deal structures.  Moreover, the opportunity for strategic evasion
is diminished.  Actors can modify behavior to circumvent liability
rules, but ordinarily it is not possible to redesign one’s mental state.265
Of course, it is possible to disguise mental state and to make it harder
to prove.  Recall that in the pit bull example the dog trainers were
working to conceal their knowledge of their dogs’ tendencies to attack
humans.  Yet this problem is nothing new for the criminal law.  Mental
state is always hard to prove and criminal liability rules always fall
short of sanctioning all blameworthy persons.
Stronger mens rea elements are only a partial solution to control-
ling the costs of overbreadth.  Heightening mens rea requirements is
not as feasible in an area like money laundering in which requiring
more than knowledge that funds are criminally derived—for example,
requiring intent to facilitate the criminal activity—would limit the law
to cases in which the actor transacting criminal proceeds is equally
liable as an accomplice to the underlying crime.  Recall the realtor
who sold the house to the drug dealer for cash.  The problem with
holding her liable for money laundering is not that she lacks a suffi-
ciently culpable state of mind.  The problem is that the social harm she
produces is not grave enough to justify making her a federal felon.  So
we must look elsewhere for the means to constrain prosecutors from
bringing cases against her and those similarly situated.
B. Institutional Design
The question of how to construct institutions optimally to guide
enforcers exercising broad authority toward desirable cases and away
from undesirable ones is critically important and far too large for
serious pursuit here.266  In addition to noting the support that my
account provides for more active discussion of institutional redesign
agendas, I will add a speculative hypothesis.
If it is true, as I argued in Part I, that enforcers and adjudica-
tors—for instrumental and normative reasons—naturally tend to
265 Willful blindness may be an exception, but the law usually blocks that dodge. See,
e.g., United States v. Heredia, 429 F.3d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding it error to give
willful ignorance instruction if defendant “actually suspected she might be involved in
criminal activity, but the record does not show that she deliberately avoided confirming her
suspicion in order to provide herself with a defense”).
266 See Schulhofer, supra note 82, at 63 (“The problem is to find ways to give prosecu-
tors a personal stake in the profits (deterrence benefits) that their efforts are expected to
generate. . . . But there is no apparent way to offer ‘profit sharing’ of that kind to prosecu-
tors.”).  For in-depth treatments of the problem of institutional design and federal
prosecutorial discretion, see Barkow, supra note 3, and Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administra-
tive System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
1560 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1491
focus their efforts on the most harmful and sophisticated actors,267
then institutional design should seek to exploit these tendencies.268
Put in the sparest of terms, institutional design should reward quality
over quantity.269  A corollary of this principle is to fight the tendency
of bureaucracies to expand for the sake of expansion.
There are many ways to do this.  Budgets can be reduced and
funds can be earmarked.270  Bureaucracies can be centralized and
given more power to control individual decisionmaking at the “line”
level.  Substantive agendas can be dictated.271  Legislatures can
engage in a variety of oversight activities and other, subtler forms of
communication that can powerfully influence enforcer behavior.272
The executive branch can foreswear evaluating prosecutorial perform-
ance by misleading proxies like caseloads and conviction rates.
In the federal system at least, one might consider the perhaps
radical idea of reducing the number of prosecutors and the number of
cases they bring, sending a clear message that the exceptionally pow-
erful tools of federal law enforcement should be reserved for the
exceptional cases in which such tools are needed.273  The problem of
267 See supra Part I.D.
268 See Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  Evidence from the Careers
of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379 (2005) (finding that successful chief federal
prosecutors tend to pursue cases eligible for more serious punishments).
269 See Wright, supra note 68, at 149 (finding from examination of data on federal plea
and trial rates, along with criminal history data, that “[d]istricts that process defendants
who present more serious criminal histories also produce lower acquittal rates, suggesting
that judges and prosecutors in these districts value quality over quantity and put extra
effort into avoiding acquittals for these high-priority defendants”); J. Mark Ramseyer et
al., Convictions Versus Conviction Rates:  The Prosecutor’s Choice 13 (Harvard John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 611, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract_id=1108813  (discussing difficulty of trying to manage agency costs among
prosecutors by monitoring their performance through poor proxy of conviction rate).
270 See Stigler, supra note 53, at 534–36 (“[I]t is much easier to make continuous mar-
ginal adjustments in a policy through the appropriations committee by varying the
resources for its enforcement than it is to modify the statute.”).
271 See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:  A Case
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 936–63 (2000) (describing
problem of overbreadth in federal child support–enforcement regime and advocating
greater use of internal, written executive branch policies to limit use of federal criminal
statutes to cases genuinely warranting federal sanction).
272 See Richman, supra note 38, at 789–805 (exploring variety of ways in which Congress
constrains conduct of federal law-enforcement agencies in spite of very large grants of
statutory authority).
273 Between 1990 and 2006, the number of federal prisoners more than tripled from
58,838 to 183,381. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.6.13.2007 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen
Maguire eds., 2008), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6132007.pdf.  During the
same period, the total number of federal prosecutors almost doubled, from about 3005 to
about 5673.  Id. at tbl.1.79.2006, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t1792006.pdf.
More enforcers produce more inmates, especially when enforcers’ performance is evalu-
November 2008] THE UPSIDE OF OVERBREADTH 1561
overbreadth in a statute, after all, is a problem of mismatch, not a
problem in the statute alone.  An overbroad statute fits some defen-
dants well but is too large for others.  One way to solve the mismatch
problem is to change the statute, but another way to solve it is to
change the defendants.  A change-the-defendants solution lies entirely
within the executive branch’s control (and thus needs no legislation)
and requires no sacrifice in terms of causing the statute to fit poorly
with other kinds of defendants.  The Department of Justice is better
positioned than any actor in the federal system, from both informa-
tional and control standpoints, to design and enforce measures that
are likely to channel its prosecutors toward the judicious use of broad
statutes against the limited set of the most industrious and harmful
actors and away from easy, high-volume, high-guilty-plea prosecutions
of quotidian crime.
C. Sentencing
Judges, whose independence ought to make them more apt than
prosecutors to worry about the costs of overbreadth in liability rules,
might have a mechanism for restricting overbreadth other than nar-
rowing rules through statutory interpretation.  The Supreme Court
has ruled that trial judges are no longer required to follow the federal
sentencing guidelines, which were binding law during the era of
greatest growth in federal prison populations.274  The sentencing judge
has been liberated to treat on any reasonable ground an individual
case as inappropriate for the sentence provided in the guidelines.  It is
perfectly reasonable to lower a sentence on the ground that a partic-
ular defendant or instance of conduct does not represent the core
harm or danger with which a broad statute is concerned.  Indeed, set-
ting aside the particular and somewhat unintended path that the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines followed, sentencing-reform projects
involving guidelines have been motivated by efforts to distinguish, in
ated through quantitative measures like caseload and conviction rates and when compo-
nents of the bureaucracy are rewarded with more resources when they can claim to be
overtaxed.  Regrettably, there is evidence that trends in the Department of Justice toward
large volumes of lower-level prosecutions are accelerating. See Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse, Federal Enforcement Data Show Major Changes in How the Bush
Administration Has Enforced the Law (2008), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/184
(reporting that, since Fiscal Year 2000, white-collar criminal prosecutions are down 27 per-
cent, official-corruption prosecutions are down fourteen percent, and organized-crime
prosecutions are down 48 percent, while immigration prosecutions are up 127 percent).
274 See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) (recognizing that “reasonable-
ness” review of federal sentences on appeal cannot, without implicating constitutional con-
straints, be construed as requiring trial judges to impose particular sentences); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232–37 (2005) (holding that federal sentencing guidelines
are unconstitutional if made binding on trial judges).
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at least some partially systematic way, between core and peripheral
cases of criminal wrongdoing.275
In a sentencing proceeding, a trial judge is able to conduct a fine-
grained examination of a case and consider a defendant’s sophistica-
tion and efforts to thwart the sanctioning regime in much the same
way that a prosecutor might look at a case when deciding whether to
charge.276  Legislatures making liability rules and appellate judges
interpreting them for use in future cases do not have this flexibility to
account for particulars.
As a direct benefit, reduced sentences for fringe cases under
broad statutes would mitigate some of overbreadth’s costs (excessive
punishment of relatively blameless actors, excessive prison popula-
tions, and so on).  But the indirect benefits might be more important.
Prosecutors do not like to invest time and resources in cases that do
not result in significant punishment.  Assuming that trial judges can
address the collective action problem that motivated Congress origi-
nally to enact the guidelines—by coordinating sentences to produce a
clear message—reducing sanctions for less threatening actors would
encourage prosecutors to shift away from charging such cases.277
At least at the district level, informal arrangements of this sort
arose even when the guidelines were binding.  The bench and the
prosecutor’s office in a district would reach an understanding that a
class of lower-level cases—the endless stream of drug importers
arriving at the airport with less than a half kilo in tow (or in their
bodies) or the countless illegal reentry violations at the Southwest
borders—would be treated less severely than the guidelines dic-
tated.278  Prosecutors had to continue to bring some such cases that
had special federal jurisdictional characteristics, but the impact of the
cases on the overall volume of federal incarceration was somewhat
275 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2007) (articulating appropriate
and inappropriate grounds for imposing sentences that depart from ranges recommended
by guidelines).
276 See, e.g., Stanton Wheeler, Adversarial Biography:  Reflections on the Sentencing of
Michael Milken, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 170 (1990) (discussing judge’s emphasis on
attempts to avoid detection in selecting harsh sentence for noteworthy white-collar
offender).
277 This will be hard to achieve, I concede.  Julie O’Sullivan worries that broad federal
liability rules in the post-Booker world will likely lead to indefensibly disparate treatment
of similarly situated offenders by sentencing judges and that code reform is more essential
now than before.  O’Sullivan, supra note 16, at 720–26.
278 See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment:  Why the Attorney Gen-
eral Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1697, 1705–07 (2003) (discussing drug importation cases); Jane L. McClellan & Jon
M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Pro-
grams:  A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 523 (2006) (discussing
immigration cases).
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diminished.  For judges to force these kinds of understandings on a
national level through individual sentencing decisions would require
difficult coordination of effort, but it is not inconceivable.  The Sen-
tencing Commission, which continues to operate in an advisory
capacity, could facilitate such coordination.279
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the criminal law as a regulatory system should include
careful thought, not just about the content of the law and of the legal
actors and institutions that enforce it, but also about those to whom
the law is addressed.  Legal rules, and the conduct of legal and polit-
ical actors, are dynamic phenomena controlled by a variety of forces.
When legal observers think about the regulated actor, though, they
tend to posit a static player with fixed preferences who has a given
response to the prospect of sanction.  This conception is inaccurate.
People make behavioral decisions in the shadow not just of sanc-
tions, but also of liability rules.  Often a regulatory regime forces an
actor to choose not between refraining and being sanctioned, but
among refraining, being sanctioned, and changing her behavior to
escape sanction.  If that new behavior offers the actor a means of real-
izing similar ends while imposing similar harms on others, the regula-
tory regime has failed.
Legal regimes naturally respond to this prospect by shaping lia-
bility rules that leave individuals with no choice but to refrain from
acting or be sanctioned.  Given that the regulated actor has a first-
mover advantage, effective rules tend to be ones with high open
texture.  The result is overbreadth:  rules that, on their terms, if not
necessarily as enforced, authorize sanctioning of conduct beyond what
generated the demand to regulate.  This pattern is evident in the fed-
eral criminal justice system, where one tends to see prosecution of the
most industrious and resourceful among those who produce social
harms.  It may occur elsewhere in criminal law and in other regulatory
systems.
Critics of overcriminalization have been correct to identify the ills
that can result when liability rules produce surplus enforcement dis-
cretion.  But observers of criminal law’s expansion may have missed
an important point about causation in attributing the excess in crim-
inal law to diseased politics and faulty normative judgments.  Some
growth in criminal law is bad government, but some of it may be the
279 See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:  Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 377–80 (2006) (discussing potentially useful role of sen-
tencing commission in system of nonbinding guidelines).
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product of a government struggling within the structural confines of
the regulatory project to control social harms.  Missing this point,
especially the inability to curtail liability rules without costs to the reg-
ulatory enterprise, is an error.  Appreciating the point may lead to
progress, including fruitful discussion of how to steer criminal enforce-
ment toward genuinely threatening actors while minimizing unjusti-
fied and overly costly sanctioning.
